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THE SOVIETS "KEEP THEIR POWDER DRY"

LABOR TURNOVER: SOVIET PROBLEM CHILD

SOVIET ECONOMY IN 1941

also

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THE SOVIETS "KEEP THEIR POWDER DRY"

By

HARRIET MOORE

In recent months, events have boxed the compass from Finland to Japan around the long circumference of Soviet borders. The reticence of Soviet officials in the last nine months—there has been no major statement on Soviet foreign policy since Molotov's report in August, 1940,—implies a continuing determination to stay out of the war if possible but to be ready for it if it comes. In the confused period of jockeying for position between England and Germany following the Balkan blitz, there has been a succession of moves by Moscow which in their totality can not have been entirely to the satisfaction of either of the belligerents involved in the European war. A review of this period may serve to order the pieces of the mosaic of Soviet action into a pattern of policy being followed in the present fast-spreading war. Information is lacking to place in full context each item of the news, whether it be the *Pravda* report of German troop movements in Finland, withdrawal of diplomatic relations from German-held Norway, Yugoslavia, and Belgium, or the ups and downs of negotiations with England and the United States. Yet in its broader aspects, Soviet practice can be analyzed and the picture filled in. This article will attempt only to discuss briefly some of the major fields in which Soviet foreign relations have been of particular interest in the past few months and to recall the background of these relations.

TRADE

In the commercial sphere, Soviet negotiators have continued in their policy of seeking trade, on equal and favorable terms, wherever they could find it. The past year has seen agreements concluded with almost every country of Europe, occupied or unoccupied. Hungary, Bulgaria, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Denmark, Rumania, Slovakia, Germany, even Switzerland which had held out since the last World War in its refusal to deal with the Bolsheviks. Outside of Europe, the United States, China, and Iran can be added to the list.

[1]

With Europe it is principally food, cotton and oil that are being exchanged for industrial raw materials and manufactured products. In the blockaded continent such trade is naturally most welcome, as was recently underlined by the purchase in the Soviet Union of \$100,000 worth of food products by the American Red Cross for relief in German-occupied Poland. To the Soviets it brings deficit materials, unpurchasable from the usual sources, and breaks down to some extent the economic isolation that war activities in the principal world markets has meant for the Soviets.

The exact dimensions of this commerce are not known, but it is apparent that from the Soviet point of view it could profitably be supplemented by trade outside of Europe—with the United States and Britain to secure machine tools so necessary to a growing industrial economy, and with the Far East for the essential raw materials of which it is the principal source. "To strengthen commercial relations with all countries" obviously remains a basic part of the formula of Soviet policy and today the USSR has trade contacts with more countries perhaps than ever before in its history, although the volume of trade is undoubtedly low.

THE BALKAN WAR

The rapid-fire chronology of Balkan events was brought to a close by the German victory, but in the period of indecision before the war enveloped the Balkan Peninsula some of the hall-marks of current Soviet policy were most clearly revealed. Moscow in September let it be known that it "could not be indifferent to the fate of the Danube," and its interest was recognized by subsequent membership in the new Danube Commission. It denied advance knowledge of the Nazi occupation of Rumania in October; it denied approval of Hungarian attachment to the Axis in November; in March it told Bulgaria that the Bulgarian Government could expect no support from the USSR in its policy of granting passage to German troops because "irrespective of the desire of the Bulgarian Government, [such a policy] does not lead to the consolidation of peace, but to the extension of the sphere of war and to Bulgaria's being involved in it."

The short story of Yugoslavia's relations with the USSR followed in some degree the course of Bulgaria's similar attempt to restore a

protective balance for its independence by improving relations with the long-shunned Soviet Union.¹ Diplomatic relations were established for the first time in June, 1940, shortly after a trade agreement had been negotiated. Finally, the anti-axis bloodless coup which came too late, was followed by a treaty of non-aggression and friendship with the USSR on the very eve of the German invasion. With no opportunity for the new government to consolidate its position and affirm its policies, Yugoslavia fell before the combined assault of long-nurtured internal frictions and the German war machine. Whatever may have been the desires of the two governments, time did not permit any implementation of the Soviet-Yugoslav treaty.

A postscript to the Balkan collapse was the Soviet note to Hungary, regarding its occupation of a section of Yugoslavia, reminding Hungary of the danger of such moves—since Hungary too has its national minorities and it too might “be torn to bits” if it got into trouble.

THE NEAR EAST

As the Balkan war burned itself out, the conflagration was carried to the Near East, skirting still another sector of the Soviet frontier. The problems raised by the extension of the Anglo-German war to the Near East are myriad. The national antagonisms of the Balkans, kept alive through the years by conflicting pressures from outside powers, pale by comparison with the hornets nest that may be stirred up in the Near East. The persecution of scattered religious minorities and old tribal rivalries have had added to them border disputes of the new national states, formed out of the Ottoman Empire and there are hardly two states in Asia Minor which have not had their serious disputes in the past two decades. Most have at one time or another clashed with the Western Powers holding mandates or extensive economic concessions there. While it is beyond the scope of this article even to attempt to list the potential conflicts in the area, no analysis of Near Eastern events can safely ignore the factors, beyond the strategy of Germany, Britain or the French forces, which make the Near East no mere battle field, but a powder keg.

¹ Cf. “Bulgaria, Turkey and the USSR,” *American Review on the Soviet Union*, February, 1941.

In contrast to the Balkan scene, Soviet relations with the countries south of its border—Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan—were close following the last war and its stand on the question of unequivocal independence for the peoples of the (Near) East has been frank and persistent. One of the points which Litvinov made in his maiden speech to the League was that the Soviet Union assumed no responsibility for what the League had done prior to Soviet entry and in particular it could not have approved of the mandate system. Although the mandates over both Iraq and Syria were formally lifted, the maintenance of British and French troops in the nominally independent countries have in fact left unsatisfied the nationalist aspirations in the area. There is little reason to suppose that any change in Soviet sympathy for such movements was implied by its refusal to enter diplomatic relation with the Iraq government as long as this was contingent upon a general Soviet declaration of support for Arab independence.² Such refusal seems more likely due to the general policy now pursued by the Soviets of handling relations with countries on a bilateral basis—without conditioning “strings” attached. And the subsequent establishment of relations on May 3 in fact gave recognition to the independence movement of the Iraqi.

The critical situation faced by Iran and Turkey as a result of the Iraq war must be of particular concern to the USSR for, historically speaking, as well as geographically, the Near Eastern neighbors of the Soviet Union bear a marked resemblance to China. The course of Turkish diplomacy in relation to the Soviet Union was traced in an earlier article³ and here it need only be brought down to date. From the signing of the Anglo-Turkish treaty in October, 1939, Moscow obviously disapproved of Turkey's entanglement with either of the main parties to the war. Repeated denials have been issued by TASS of rumored Soviet participation in negotiations aimed toward implementing the alliance, as well as denying any Soviet threat to Turkey on its northern frontier. Ankara, too, has echoed these denials and on March 26 the two governments ex-

² TASS, May 11, reported that at the end of 1940 the Iraq government had suggested the establishment of diplomatic relations, accompanied by such a declaration by the USSR.

³ *American Review on the Soviet Union*, February, 1941, *op. cit.*

changed statements on their relations. Reaffirming the non-aggression pact existing between them since 1925, the Soviets declared that "if Turkey is actually attacked and forced to go to war to defend its own territory" it could count on "full understanding and neutrality" on the part of the USSR. While no blank check of approval for any possible Turkish action, this statement gave Soviet backing to the cautious policy pursued by Turkey which has enabled it to date to remain off the field of battle and to preserve its national independence.

There has as yet been no Soviet reaction to reports that Turkey permitted German troop ships to pass through the Dardanelles or more recently to rumors that it has granted passage on its railroads to German troops and military supplies. By analogy to Rumania and Bulgaria, the latter action, if substantiated, would hardly be expected to evoke Soviet cheers.

Iran, the other major Near Eastern neighbor of the USSR, which is now within sound of the battle, has after a brief lapse in commercial relations, from 1938 to 1939, reopened trade with the Soviets⁴ and has taken occasion in the last month to deny foreign rumors of any rift in their relations. The Iranian trade representative in the United States said that in fact relations were more than usually cordial.

THE FAR EAST

The headline event in the Far East has, of course, been the Soviet-Japanese pact of April 13, 1941 (for text see p. 72). Much has been written on the significance of the pact and the various reactions to it in other countries.⁵ What has perhaps not received the attention due it is its history and the exact nature of the pact as compared with other pacts signed by the USSR.

It is, of course, an old story how the USSR offered a non-aggression pact to Japan first in December, 1931, after the outbreak of war in Manchuria. What is sometimes forgotten, however, is that then, as in succeeding years when the offer was frequently renewed, the

⁴ For discussion of the new agreement, see *American Review on the Soviet Union*, February, 1941, *op cit*.

⁵ For list of articles dealing with the pact, see *Current Articles on the Soviet Union*, p. 73 ff.

Soviets had already let it be known where their sympathies lay in regard to Chinese independence and the outcome of the war in the Far East. The numerous exchanges of statements and notes on the subject of a pact from 1932 to 1936 made clear that the Soviets regarded it as a basis for normalizing relations with Japan—for negotiating peacefully on the settlement of serious points of friction between them. As *Izvestia* remarked, in 1936, a non-aggression pact is no “love token”—it is the basis for improving relations especially with countries with which there are conflicts. Moscow always regarded Japan’s unwillingness to conclude such an agreement as a sign that Japan sought the conflicts and was not particularly eager to settle them peacefully. The significance of the recent treaty for the Soviets therefore lies in the fact that the present Japanese Government was ready to sign it, rather than in the terms of the pact itself. That the new treaty was directly in line with the old Soviet proposal seems evident both from its terms and from the editorial comment on it in the Soviet press.

SOVIET PACTS

The pacts which the USSR has had with other countries can conveniently be divided into several groups. The first group, to which the Japanese treaty bears no relation, includes the mutual assistance pacts. These have been of two kinds, bilateral—of which there is now only one—that with the Mongol Peoples Republic (such pacts were also signed with the three Baltic States in September and October, 1939), and multi-lateral to which the French and Czech pacts belonged. The latter were intended to be the logical and advanced stage of collective security arrangements within the framework of the League of Nations system. It was this type of pact which was envisaged in the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations just prior to the outbreak of war.

The second group consists of the non-aggression and/or neutrality pacts of which there were many. The only multi-lateral agreement of this kind outside of the League Covenant itself was the Kellogg-Briand Pact which the Soviets brought into effect with its neighbors in advance of final ratification by the other signatories. Closely linked with this was the treaty defining aggression which it

negotiated in 1933 with most of the countries on its western border.

The bilateral non-aggression treaties are grouped chronologically: those before, during, and after the collective security era. The earliest pacts were signed in 1926 and 1927 with Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Germany, and Lithuania. While the wording in each varied to some extent, particularly the Afghanistan treaty, as reworded in 1931, they provided in general that in case one party was involved in war by a third power the other would observe neutrality. However, the wording was not specific as it was in the pacts of the collective security stage; the treaties with Italy, France, Finland and Poland signed in 1932 and 1933 all carried the "escape clause." If one party attacked a third country, the other could denounce the treaty without notice. In fact, the Soviets threatened to do this in case Poland attempted to invade Czechoslovakia in September, 1938, and it held that its participation in sanctions against Italy in the Abyssinian war was not in contravention of its non-aggression treaty with Italy.

Of a slightly different kind were the treaties with Latvia and Estonia signed in 1932 as a supplement to the Kellogg pact. They provided machinery for settling disputes and gave a non-aggression guarantee, but they made no provision for action in case of attack by third powers.

Although the China treaty was signed in 1937, technically in the era of collective security, it contained no "escape clause," possibly because what signs there were of a collective system had been confined entirely to Europe. (The French pact specifically excluded the Far East.) The obligation in this treaty also went beyond many others in providing that in case one signatory was attacked the other would give no direct or indirect aid to the attacker.

The German-Soviet Pact of August, 1939, marked the end of Soviet hopes for collective security after the failure of the Anglo-French-Soviet talks. This treaty not only referred back to the 1926 neutrality pact but reverted to the old wording—if one party is the "object of military actions on the part of the third power" (*okazhetsia obektom voennykh deistvii so storony tretei derzhavi*) instead of the other formula, "the object of attack," (*yavitsia predmetom napadeniia*) used in the collective security pacts. This agreement

also provided machinery for settling disputes between the two countries as they arise.

The Yugoslav treaty of April, 1941, used the words, "subject to attack" but it went further than the German: a guarantee was given not to support the attacking power and also to observe a "policy of friendly relations" in case of war.

THE JAPANESE PACT

As to the Japanese pact, its wording differs from that of the German and Yugoslavian, as well as the Chinese. It provides that if one signatory is the object of military actions, the other will observe neutrality. It says nothing about a policy of friendship in case of war or even of refraining from aiding the enemy of the other party. It is of particular interest in this respect to note that *Pravda* (April 19) reported that Ambassador Tatekawa had asked for a pact like the German pact, but that the Soviets preferred to give them one analogous to the German Pact of 1926 which was simply a statement of non-aggression and neutrality, without further obligations for consultation, etc. It will be recalled that Soviet comment on the German pact in 1939 had regarded it as a sign that existing points at issue had been settled and the pact itself followed a trade agreement. *Izvestia* (April 15) commented that "the conclusion of the treaty [with Japan] has not yet settled all the various problems of Soviet-Japanese relations, but it opens the road to their settlement." Fisheries and trade negotiations were to follow.

The reactions to the pact in general recognized that it was an attempt to normalize relations and that it carried with it no broad obligations or implications for Soviet relations to other nations.⁶ The Chinese government accepted the Soviet assurances that it meant no change in Soviet attitude to China.⁷ (The press has since reported continued shipments of Soviet supplies to Chungking.) The declaration respecting the boundaries of Manchoukuo and the Mongol Peoples Republic, judging from subsequent comment, was

⁶ Cf. Statement of Secretary of State Hull and comment from Chungking, cited in the *News Chronology*, p. 88.

⁷ For discussion of Chinese-Soviet relations, cf. "The Soviet Union and China," *American Review on the Soviet Union*, April, 1941.

pragmatic recognition of the fact that this source of friction would have to be eliminated in order to have the pact mean anything at all and it was not meant to constitute *de jure* recognition of the governments of these countries.

CONCLUSION

To the account of specific diplomatic steps taken by the Soviet Union as occasion has arisen to define its relations with neighboring countries, there is little new that can be added in the way of information on Moscow's relations with the major powers involved in the war. None the less certain broader tendencies can be noted. The first of these is indicated in the persistent denials by the Soviet Union of any collaboration with either of the belligerents in multi-lateral arrangements, whether it be with Germany regarding Japan and the Far East or with Britain regarding Turkey and the Near East, just as there were earlier denials of cooperation with Germany in Hungary or Rumania and with Britain in Greece. The independence of Soviet policy receives continued emphasis.

The second thread that runs through Soviet relations with the great powers is a continuing effort to make trade arrangements with all and sundry. Although they have been willing to give assurance to Britain and the United States regarding reexports, little or no success has been recorded in these negotiations. The volume of trade with the United States since the last trade agreement has been large, exceeding \$50,000,000 in the first eight months of the agreement year, but the last few months have witnessed such a drop, as American licensing provisions have been extended to cover some 98 per cent of the usual Soviet purchases, that it has been suggested in the American press that the American-Soviet annual trade agreement may not be renewed.⁸

While it is obvious that the Soviets desire to remain out of the war and they have avoided unnecessary or provocative statements on the actions of other nations, their policy can hardly be said to be wholly negative. A recent statement quoted from *Komsomolskaia Pravda* seems to sum up the things they have said and done in recent

⁸ The current trade agreement guaranteed Soviet purchases of \$40,000,000. For text, see *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, November, 1940.

months: "Although not participating in the war, the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to events. Any action which is aimed at expansion of the war or which affects to a certain extent the interests of the Soviet Union is condemned by the Soviet Union, and on the contrary anything that may or can help the struggle against the expansion of the war is supported by the Soviet Union."⁹ Defense Commissar Timoshenko said in his speech on May Day that the USSR believes that the "peoples of all the warring countries are trying to put an end to the war, to establish peace. And we believe that they will get peace. And the sooner they get peace the better." But in the meantime, the Soviets seem well aware of the dangers to them inherent in the fast-spreading Anglo-German war and have adopted a formula enunciated by the head of the State Planning Commission of keeping their powder dry and building up their defenses.

⁹ *New York Herald Tribune*, May 22, 1941.

THE PROBLEM OF LABOR TURNOVER

A REVIEW OF SOVIET LEGISLATION

Almost a year has elapsed since the adoption on June 26, 1940, of a law which modified in certain important respects existing labor legislation in the Soviet Union. The attention given this federal law in Soviet publications during the months following its passage exceeds that accorded any other piece of legislation in recent years. The amount of commentary, elucidation, and editorializing it has evoked is even somewhat reminiscent of the intensive educational campaigns which surrounded the adoption of the new Soviet Constitutions in 1936-37. Of the subjects covered by the June law, none received more notice than those involved in the attempt to curb labor turnover (*tekuchest*) among workers and employees.¹

While considerable mobility is expected in a rapidly expanding economy where new projects are constantly being completed and large numbers of workers and employees move on to tackle the next construction job, it was another kind of mobility that was causing concern in the Soviet Union; this was the self-sought, self-created, planless kind because of which a given job in the course of a year would be filled by a succession of individuals. With higher levels of output regarded by the Soviets as essential for the creation of the abundance requisite for the transition to communism, and with excessive turnover of workers and employees an obvious obstacle in

¹ The June 26 provisions concerning the length of the working day and week have already been reviewed briefly in "The Soviet Hours Law," *American Review on the Soviet Union*, April, 1941, pp. 59-62. The social insurance provisions of the law will be considered in a later article.

"Workers and employees" is a term which, in Soviet usage, includes agricultural workers on State farms and machine-tractor stations. Together with their families, they constituted at the time of the 1939 census, half the Soviet population. While collective and individual farmers are omitted from the present consideration, it should none the less be remembered that the relationship between laboring conditions in town and country is very close in the USSR and that the Rules (*Ustav*) of agricultural artels, regulating labor within the collective farms, are considered by Soviet writers to belong within the "single system of socialist labor law" of which the Codes of Labor Law of the various republics, regulating labor of "workers and employees," are but a part.

the race for increased productivity, it is clear that this problem is one of major significance in the USSR.

The problem of labor turnover has a legislative history and it will be seen that the June provisions are but the most recent of a long series of attempts to cope with job-switching, lateness, and truancy.^{1a} And just as the legal commentary in Soviet journals and reports of court decisions since last June provide insight into the operation of law, so will a review of previous laws on the subject provide insight into the nature of the problem, for an examination of the labor turnover problem is an examination of something peculiarly Soviet. This point finds constant emphasis by Soviet commentators who, with their tenacity in distinguishing their institutions from those elsewhere, evince an almost paternal affection for their excessive labor turnover. Their problem child, they insist, is a socialist baby, impossible of conception anywhere else than in a society where planned economy has abolished unemployment and, by providing security, has eliminated the usual "fear" controls. In a tense international situation, however, childish antics possess a more sinister aspect, and the Soviets are now trying to confine movement within the framework of a plan by removing the factors legitimately causing restlessness and at the same time meting out punishment for heedless refusals to grow up and take life seriously. Soviet writers point out that in the current world armaments race only the Soviet Union is without a "reserve army of unemployed" and must rely almost completely on the increased productivity of its permanent corps. With a maximum eight-hour day, it is evident that higher labor productivity in the USSR depends largely on changes in the technical base (further mechanization of industrial processes) and strict observance of the constitutional obligation "to preserve labor discipline" (Art. 130).

RIGHT TO WORK AND OBLIGATION TO WORK

Labor, the "first, fundamental condition of human existence," has always been regarded in the Soviet Union as the right of every man and woman. The Federal Constitution of 1936 (Article 118)

^{1a} Truancy will be used here to mean specifically absence from work without legitimate excuse.

states that the citizen has the right to work, that is, to receive guaranteed work with payment in accordance with the amount and quality of his performance. It goes on to say that this right to work is assured by the social organization of national economy, the rise in the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the liquidation of unemployment. This right to work was a recognized principle even when the socialist republic was struggling with its heritage of unemployment; every worker out of a job was entitled to unemployment benefits. Along with the principle of the right to work there was the corollary principle of the obligation to work. The 1936 Constitution (Article 12) puts it this way: Labor in the USSR is an obligation and matter of honor of each able-bodied citizen according to the principle "he who does not work, does not eat." The implementation of this principle has varied in the different stages of Soviet development and has reflected the internal and external problems which the country faced in each period. The 1918 Code of Labor Legislation of the RSFSR established universal labor obligation. Article 1, Section 1, said that all citizens shall be subject to compulsory labor except those under 16, over 50, those incapacitated by injury or illness, and women eight weeks before and eight weeks after confinement. With these exceptions, anyone not engaged in useful public work could be summoned by the local soviets for such service on conditions determined locally by the Department of Labor and the trade unions. Hiring was done through the Division of Labor Distribution, and the worker could not refuse a job at his vocation. In this way the "exploiting classes" not used to working and those workers conditioned to unconscientious attitudes by harsh Tsarist labor conditions were prevented from loafing at the expense of their fellow citizens from whose more diligent efforts came the surplus paid out in unemployment benefits. Soviet legal scholars term the universal labor obligation of the 1918 code the necessary form of legal relations concerning labor under conditions of foreign intervention and civil war. With the ensuing period of peacetime economic and cultural construction, there came the legal regulation

² This 1922 Code of Labor Law of the RSFSR is, with many amendments, still in effect and has served as a model for the codes of the other Soviet republics. Reference

of labor expressed in the 1922 Code.² The necessity for the institution of universal labor obligation had been done away with; it remained only in vestigial form. *In exceptional circumstances* (struggle against disasters created by the elements, insufficiency in the labor force for fulfillment of vital government tasks), all citizens with certain exemptions could be pressed into work on the basis of labor obligation. The exemptions consisted of more and larger categories than had the earlier legislation.³ In the 1922 Code, then, the work agreement⁴ became "the fundamental organizational legal form" of increasing the ranks of workers and employees. The Soviet citizen is not obliged by the Code to enter into a work agreement. Social pressure, educational stimuli, and material need make it the usual thing for Soviet people to be at work, but there is no legal compulsion for them to enter industry. There has been this exception, however: attached to the right to study at certain higher technical schools there has been a corresponding obligation upon the graduate to work at his specialty for a certain number of years, a situation that has recently been expanded by the decree establishing new vocational schools. (Cf. "The New Soviet Education Decrees," *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, December 17, 1940). But for the main body of citizens the legislation of the last few years has not changed the 1922 situation under which entrance into a work agreement was voluntary. Once he has entered into a work agreement, however, the individual is subject to the Code's provisions concerning the termination of one work agreement and entrance upon another, provisions of importance in the matter of labor turnover.

to specific code provisions will be limited here, for brevity's sake, to those of the RSFSR code. While each of the constituent republics adopts its own code of labor law, the federal government, in accordance with the Constitution (Art. 14, 1) has within its jurisdiction the "establishment of principles of labor legislation," and these centrally promulgated standards set forth in federal decrees, such as that of June 26, 1940, become part of the republics' labor law.

² Those under 18 and men over 45, women over 40, convalescents, women eight weeks before and eight after confinement, nursing mothers, invalids of labor and war, women with children under eight years of age with no one to care for them. The Council of People's Commissars and the Commissariat of Labor were to add other exceptions and exemptions dependent on conditions of health, family situation, kind of work, and living conditions. (Section 3, Article 13, RSFSR Labor Code.)

⁴ Paragraph 27. "The work agreement is an agreement between two or more individuals according to which one party offers his working capacity to the employer for a wage."

EDUCATION AND COMPULSION

Labor discipline in Soviet usage means "the conscientious, scrupulous relation of the individual to his work."⁵ The phrase often used is that the citizen must develop a "socialist attitude" towards his work, he must be aware that the destiny of a socialist society is influenced by the day-to-day work of every individual in it, that increased labor productivity is basic to the attainment of communism. The Soviets did not expect to develop overnight a new discipline of labor, new forms of social relationship and attitudes towards work. Lenin recognized this to be a task of many years, even decades. He insisted on the need for direct compulsion in relation to those who refused to recognize the social character of work in a socialist society. And while of the two means for strengthening labor discipline—education and compulsion—the Soviet government since 1922 has stressed the former, it has never ceased to rely on the latter as well, a fact evident in any examination of Soviet labor legislation.⁶ Soviet writers emphasize that compulsion has been necessary for a very small minority; that the majority of workers and employees have, since the first *subbotnik*,⁷ responded to the country's efforts "to educate workers in the spirit of communism." This spirit is best explained in Marx's phrase that under communism work will be a need, like air, food, sun, and that the individual will have an opportunity to enjoy work as a play of physical and intellectual forces.

The illiterate peasant and near-peasant, for the first time in the terrifying presence of modern machines, was the clay into which

⁵ *Politicheskii Slovar*, Gosizdat, 1940, p. 178.

⁶ "The history of socialist labor law is replete with examples of how, along with the growth of socialist attitude to work, the legal measures of struggle with violators of labor discipline were strengthened." Alexandrov, N., "Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR ot 26 Iunia 1940 g. i Voprosy Nauki Sotsialisticheskogo Trudovogo Prava," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, Nos. 8-9, 1940, p. 37. This writer mentions the efforts of certain labor law theoreticians, now discredited, to affirm that the development of socialist competition leads to the withering away of legal forms of labor relations and the dying off of methods of governmental legal influence in the sphere of labor discipline.

⁷ So-called, because Saturday—*Subbota*—was originally the day on which Communists and sympathizers worked extra hours without pay as a contribution to society.

the new spirit was to be infused. An educational campaign of ambitious proportions was launched. It took many forms, ranging from the eradication of illiteracy and the institution of free technical courses at places of work to material and prestige rewards for those whose efforts led the country from the *subbotnik* to shock brigade work to socialist competition and the Stakhanov movement. With the Five-Year Plans, educational efforts have been accelerated. The increase in labor productivity planned for each year was recognized by Soviet authorities to depend not only on mechanization but on each worker's effort to know his machine better and make it produce more. And a conscientious job, the worker was taught, meant not only doing his own tasks in a more and more scientific way but helping his fellow-workers to raise their qualifications and contribute more to the general fund of goods and services in which all shared. This "comradely help to backward workers by the advanced ones in order to achieve a general rise," it was emphasized, is characteristic of competition in the socialist sense. The results of these campaigns were demonstrated in the fact that at the end of the second Five-Year Plan the level of labor productivity in industry was almost 3.3 times greater than the highest pre-war level of Russia. But the relative prosperity which ensued, coupled with a sense of security arising from the disappearance of unemployment, operated to relax the effects of the educational campaign in the case of some individuals. In the face of the task of the third Five-Year Plan to increase labor productivity in industry by 65 per cent and the difficult international situation within which this is to be accomplished, the Soviet Union has in recent years taken stronger measures against violations of labor discipline.

TERMINATION OF THE WORK AGREEMENT

The legislation of June 26, 1940, was directed against what the Soviets term "two most widespread and harmful violations of labor discipline: truancy (*progul*) and job quitting (*letunstvo*). While the right of the worker to quit his job at pleasure has never been a principle of Soviet labor legislation, the extent of limitation of mobility has varied widely from the days of War Communism to the present. In the 1918 RSFSR Labor Code, articles 51 to 53 indi-

cated that voluntary resignation by the worker from an establishment, enterprise or institution had to be preceded by an examination of the reasons for the resignation by "the respective organ of workmen's self-government (works committees, etc.)." The decision could be appealed to the trade union, and a worker who quit work contrary to the decision of the committee had to forfeit for one week the right to register with the Division of Labor Distribution. In those early years the Soviet worker had to put it up to his shopmates whether his reasons for quitting were reasonable and his failure to abide by their negative decision, after appeal, was punishable by enforced idleness and the forfeiture of unemployed benefits for a week. In a Soviet explanation⁸ of this provision it is emphasized that in those years of unemployment the worker who was out of a job was entitled to draw from the public treasury his regular wages until the government found him another job, and therefore if every worker had been at liberty to quit his job at pleasure there would have been a temptation for many a man to loaf at public expense. The corollary limitation on the employer's right to fire (Articles 46-50) was also recalled in this connection.

The 1922 Labor Code of the RSFSR relaxed the provisions on job quitting and, while unemployment benefits were still payable to the worker, he was permitted to end a work-contract of indefinite duration merely by giving a one-day warning if he were on a weekly payroll and seven days warning if on a bi-weekly or monthly payroll. His reasons for leaving were not subject to approval. There was apparently no limitation on the number of times he could change jobs. Under these circumstances, with the rapid expansion of Soviet economy as the first Five-Year Plan got under way, the problem of labor turnover in industry began to assume acute form. On December 15, 1930, a law was passed on "hiring and distribution of the labor force and struggle against labor turnover." Some attempt was made at a planned distribution of the labor force by having most of the hiring done through labor organs. "Malicious disorganizers of production," quitting their jobs without legitimate cause, were for six months not to be sent by the labor organs into jobs in industry

⁸ *The Labor Laws of Soviet Russia*, The Russian Government Bureau, New York, 1920. p. 53.

and transport. But this deterrent was not effective. It was difficult to enforce it in the face of the need for all available manpower, reliable or not. The problem lay not only in the need for a planned distribution of the available labor force but in the creation of new reserves of labor to keep up with the swift tempo of industrialization. The solution lay in the mechanization of agriculture, the participation of women in production, the technical training of the youth. But the country was pulling itself up by its bootstraps. For women to work, creches, kindergartens, factory kitchens had to be set up. For technicians to be trained, technicians had to be released from production and set to teaching. For agriculture to be mechanized, man-hungry industry had to produce machines. It took time, although amazingly little time considering the size of the task.

But meanwhile the 1930 law had practically lapsed; in 1937 it was repealed outright. In this period habits of job switching arose which have persisted to this day. Since there was a shortage of manpower and the distribution of the labor force was not planned, management bid against management for workers' services. New areas of the country were being developed; workers were urged to man the new "giants of construction." Under these circumstances it was difficult to create an atmosphere of social disapproval for the worker who popped in and out of the factory. The management of industrial enterprises grew so accustomed to this constant coming and going that they themselves began to consider it inevitable and took few steps to counteract it. The newspaper of the Heavy Industry Commissariat,⁹ for example, tells how light-hearted management had grown about letting workers go, in many cases not even troubling to arrange for a personal interview to ascertain the cause of the worker's leaving and to inquire into the possibility of rectifying the particular dissatisfaction. The Stalin Metal Plant from January to May of 1936 had taken 784 new workers on and let 887 out. Recent legislation has faced the task of persuading management, as well as worker, of the need for a more stable labor force.

On December 28, 1938, among the provisions adopted "for regulating labor discipline" there was one that increased the length

⁹ *Za Industrializatsiiu*, June 6, 1937.

of quitting notice; workers and employees wishing to leave had to give the administration a month's warning. For a year and a half this curb on labor turnover was tried. It did not improve matters. The truancy regulations, to be recounted below, were utilized to obviate the need for giving the month's notice. Jobs continued to be changed with wasteful frequency. When a single individual took a new job every six weeks or so, he not only produced little himself but seriously lowered the production record of each enterprise he entered and left. All through the thirties the Soviet press had reflected the concern felt about this demoralizing factor; when the war broke out in Europe in 1939, a sharper note was heard, and in June, 1940, severe provisions were finally adopted, as "a consequence," it was stated, "of current international conditions." Voluntary quitting was forbidden all workers and employees in state, cooperative, and social enterprises and institutions. While the right to fire workers remains limited under Article 47 of the Code, and subject to appeal, permission to leave a job must now be obtained by the worker from the head of the enterprise. Such permission must be granted in certain cases: illness, entrance into higher or middle technical schools, pregnancy leaves, old age. In addition, the Director's permission can also be discretionary; if he feels that the work of the enterprise will not be affected adversely he can approve the worker's request regardless of cause. A worker can terminate his contract on a unitary basis, that is without the other party's agreement, in the case of domestic workers and those employed by a few foreign concessions still existing in the Soviet Union.¹⁰ This is also true in all probability of workers and employees in the private enterprises which exist under the constitutions of the new Baltic Soviet Socialist

¹⁰ Also, in case of members of industrial cooperatives, permission to leave is mandatory for entrance into a state enterprise or institution (S.P. USSR, 1940, No. 20,486). In rural localities if the cooperative member is also a kolkhoznik, he is released from artel work at times stated in the cooperative-kolkhoz contract or by agreement between the chairmen of the cooperative and the kolkhoz. Several months after the law was passed, various women in institutions which do not as yet provide creches for their employees' children wrote to *Izvestia*, suggesting that domestic workers should be made subject to the June 26 law, because their lateness, etc., directly affects the work of their employers. *Izvestia* in its discussion of this question, Dec. 30, 1940, emphasized that since domestic workers worked for private hire, they must be controlled only by their trade union.

Republics where the RSFSR codes of law are temporarily applicable, inasmuch as the June law specifically applies only to state and co-operative enterprises.

The provisions of the new law, even without commentary, give some insight into its motivation. It is not an attempt to prevent all labor turnover; it is rather an attempt to reduce the fluidity in fields directly related to the country's "economic and military might" and, by making that fluidity dependent on two-party consent, to bring into consideration not only the individual's immediate desires but the collective's needs based on the sum total of individual desires, and expressed in the Five-Year Plans.

ABSENCE WITHOUT LEGITIMATE REASON

Closely tied up with the problem of turnover has been that of truancy, and the attempt to prick this daily blister has been going on for years. The measures have been varied. Some have been directed at improving the services supplied the worker in order to obviate the need for time off. In January, 1927,¹¹ for example, in a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "on struggling against truancy," it was provided that dispensary service was to be made available outside of working time and the worker was not to be paid for time lost by going to the medical center during working hours if the matter could wait until after hours. The attack on drunkenness, a large truancy factor particularly in the twenties, was implemented by limiting insurance payments for temporary disability arising out of this cause. The three-day waiting period in such cases, established in January, 1927 as a deterrent, was in November, 1929, raised to five days.^{11*} On the eve of the second Five-Year Plan the provision for firing workers because of truancy had been extended. Up until this point the worker could be fired for a violation of labor discipline only if he were truant three days during any one month; the November 15, 1932, legislation¹² made it possible to fire him for a single failure to appear without legitimate excuse and impossible for the enterprise in question to rehire him within

¹¹ S. Z. i R. No. 13, 1927. Post. 134.

^{11*} S. Z. No. 74. Post. 710.

¹² S. Z. No. 78. Post. 475.

a year. Provision was made for appeal. Firing, however, was hardly a deterrent in itself; the sea of employment was wide and the worker could go swimming elsewhere. But apartments were scarcer than jobs. To lose his job was a mere detail; to lose his room was a factor to be weighed in the balance of resisting temptation to idle. Supplementing the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of November 15, the Commissariat of Labor issued an instruction on the 26th in which the enterprise could eject the worker fired for truancy from the premises which it had supplied him.¹³ With ejection from living quarters usually severely limited by Soviet law,¹⁴ this provision gives some indication of the importance attached to the problem of truancy. The law was severe; its enforcement was lax. The worker could absent himself with impunity; the factory management showed marked reluctance to fire the workers it needed so badly. It was no secret that managers were prepared to overlook a few days absence. This attitude had repercussions in the sphere of lateness. Arriving at work a few minutes late, leaving for lunch or for home a few minutes early, became a widespread practice and the careless minutes amounted to a staggering number of hours. In a Leningrad Metal Plant in 1938, 34,560 working hours were lost in latenesses alone, ("sufficient to build a mighty steam turbine" comments *Pravda* in its editorial January 10, 1939.) Not only the latecomer's productivity but that of the other workers at his bench was affected. "To tolerate lateness is to tolerate enormous losses," *Pravda* warned. It was up to the working population, peasant in background, to acquire an urban respect for minutes.

The December, 1938, legislation sought to curb unjustified lateness, early leaving, and mealtime stretching by subjecting them to administrative penalty; reprimand, then reprimand with warning of dismissal, transfer to lower paid work for three months, demotion to less responsible work. Workers and employees committing three such violations in one month or four in two months were to be fired as truants. The 1938 legislation frankly recognized that the 1932 law was not being fulfilled and in order to implement the provision

¹³ RSFSR Code of Labor Law, Art. 47.

¹⁴ Cf. Hazard, J. N., *Soviet Housing Law*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939. p. 73.

for firing truants, the new legislation made heads of enterprises responsible and subject to removal from work and court trial for failure to carry out the law. Because it was expected that a serious attempt would now be made to carry out the lateness and truancy provisions, the question arose: how late is late. The practice in factories had been to consider the worker late if he appeared at work 10 or 15 minutes after the workday had begun and to consider him truant if he made his appearance after that time. The Explanatory Supplement to the December law, issued January 9, 1939, now made 20 minutes the dividing line. Anyone getting to work after that time without legitimate excuse, would not be admitted; he would be considered truant, and subject to dismissal.

It was evident a few months after the legislation had been enacted that it was failing to achieve its purpose. Unjustified absences and latenesses continued, workers were accordingly discharged, and labor turnover continued to be excessive. Shvernik, in his report before the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in April, 1939, urged the workers to strengthen their measures of combatting breaches of labor discipline. Meetings, posters, courts of honor set up by the workers themselves were suggested. Little over a year later Shvernik was to point out the loopholes in the 1938 legislation and to recommend more effective restraints on lateness and truancy to meet the sterner conditions of war-time Europe. The 1938 legislation had increased rather than decreased lateness and truancy. Because a month's notice for leaving was found irksome by those who wished to change jobs frequently, they deliberately got themselves fired by arriving over twenty minutes late without legitimate excuse. The law to punish lateness by dismissal had become an instrument for increasing labor turnover. The device of workbooks, reinstituted in 1938,¹⁵ was not effective; shorthanded

¹⁵ Workbooks had been provided for in the 1918 RSFSR Code of Labor Legislation but omitted in the 1922 Code. In 1926 and 1929 labor certificates were decreed, but it was soon found that the factory rarely examined certificates when hiring workers and employees. Unlike the 1918 provision under which penalties were to be recorded in the workbooks, the 1938 workbooks were specifically limited to recording awards but not penalties. The Workbooks were to contain the following information: (A) Surname, given name, and patronymic; (B) Age; (C) Education; (D) Profession and information on his work; (E) His transfer from one enterprise to another; (F) the reasons for this transfer; (G) Encouragements and awards.

factory managements did not hesitate to employ workers whose workbooks revealed job-changing histories.

With all efforts in 1940 concentrated on limiting labor mobility, firing as a penalty for unjustified absence was discarded and other measures were substituted. "In the present international situation," a Soviet commentator explained, "when the socialist country must strengthen its defense and economic might to a maximum, drifting from job to job and truancy take on the character of socially dangerous acts. Hence they are treated as crimes, and subject to criminal responsibility."¹⁶ The June 26, 1940, legislation made unitary breach of the work contract in state and cooperative enterprises a matter for the courts and punishable by a prison sentence of two to four months. Absence without legitimate cause could be punished by the courts with corrective labor at the place of work for a period up to six months with a fine of up to 25 per cent of wage.¹⁷ An added deterrent was the swift consideration—within five days—which the courts were ordered to give such cases.¹⁸ Directors who failed to take such cases to court were themselves subject to judicial action.

THE OPERATION OF THE LAW

The June 26 legislation and the decrees supplementing it placed a difficult task before the courts not only in terms of quantitative increase of case load but in the matter of interpretation. Two new offenses were added to the books which required of the judges and states' attorneys, whose own staffs were not guiltless in these respects, a complete reorientation in dealing with matters of lateness, truancy,

¹⁶ Aleksandrov, *op. cit.* p. 37.

¹⁷ Those who during the serving of this sentence are absent without legitimate reason are regarded as attempting to evade sentence (July 23, 1940, *Explanation of Supreme Court Plenum*) and in accordance with each republic's code of corrective labor law, the rest of the period of the sentence must be spent in prison.

¹⁸ Two days after the law was passed, the courts were already looking into cases of this kind (*Pravda*, June 29, 1940.) Further to expedite matters, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on August 10, 1940 issued an order to the effect that cases involving absences without legitimate cause and job quitting are to be heard by the people's judges sitting alone, without the participation of the two lay judges.

and job-switching. That the courts made many errors, usually in the direction of leniency, is evident in a review of the cases and commentary in two major Soviet legal sources.¹⁹ This leniency is considered one of the factors preventing the creation of a public opinion severely critical of violations of labor discipline, "an atmosphere of moral boycott of idlers, truants, and job-switchers" in the phrase of Commissar of Justice Rychkov. While the number of truantries had decreased sharply in all branches of industry by December 26, 1940, according to a *Pravda* editorial evaluating six months of the law's operation, the downtrend was not an unbroken line: in the coal industry and in some of the enterprises in other fields the number of truantries in October was actually greater than in the previous month. This situation to some extent reflects the failure of the courts to distinguish truancy from job-quitting. With the penalty for quitting a job without permission more severe than that for unjustified absence, it becomes a matter of importance to distinguish between these two acts which are in practice done jointly: the individual wishes to leave, does not appear, commits an unjustified absence. This and other problems of interpreting the June 26 law receive detailed treatment in the Alexandrov article already cited and in a later article by Vyshinskaia and Menshagin.²⁰

The distinction between quitting without permission and truancy lies not in the length of the period of absence but in the presence of a deliberate intention to sever the work contract with the given enterprise without the consent of the director. This intent to quit may be obvious—the worker announces in advance that he will not return—or it may be inferred from other circumstances, such as taking a job elsewhere. The June 26 legislation has been extended so that among those liable for quitting without permission are not only the workers and employees of state, cooperative, and social

¹⁹ *Sovetskaia Yustitsia*, the semi-monthly journal of the Commissariat of Justice and the Supreme Court of the USSR; and *Sotsialisticheskaia Zakonnost*, the monthly journal of the USSR State Attorney's Office. A writer in one of these (Goliakov in No. 23-24 of *Sovetskaia Yustitsia*, 1940) places responsibility for this situation in part upon the failure of legal scientists to work over the problem of law involved in the obligation to work honorably and to provide the guidance necessary for bettering court practice in this connection.

²⁰ *Sotsialisticheskaia Zakonnost*, December, 1940.

enterprises, including staff workers and combine operators of Machine-Tractor Stations, but tractorists and brigadiers of tractor brigades and their helpers in the MTS (cf. July 17, 1940 Decree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet of the USSR), young specialists who fail to report to their assigned position upon graduation from a higher school (cf. Order of the Commissar of Justice and the State Attorney of the USSR, September 25, 1940), and those subject to the Decree of October 19, 1940 who fail to make the transfer ordered by the Commissariat. Once having quit without permission, the worker cannot return to his job and undo the charge against him. Some of the courts have been criticized for changing the charge from job-quitting to truancy when those who quit, frightened by the threat of court proceedings, hurried back to the original job. The purpose for which the individual quit his job is not considered of significance in the matter; whether he did it to loaf or to take on another job, the important consideration is whether he intended to abrogate the work contract.

Just as intent is pivotal for job-quitting, so the sufficiency of reason for the lateness or the absence is central for truancy. The circumstances under which the lateness or the absence occurred must be examined in detail. Since exceptional circumstances relieve the individual of criminal liability for truancy, the courts were held in error for applying paragraphs 51 and 53 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (and the corresponding provisions in the criminal codes of the other union republics) which permitted lowering the penalty below the established legal minimum in the presence of exceptional circumstances, and they were forbidden to do so.^a Lateness without sufficient reason exceeding twenty minutes continues under the June 26 law, as under the 1938 legislation, to be regarded as truancy, with the addition^b that the twenty-minute line applies as well to unjustified lateness in returning from lunch and to early departures for lunch or home. Idleness for over twenty minutes during working hours also falls within the category of truancy.^c Where the time in-

^a Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR, August 15, 1940.

^b Order of the Commissariat of Justice and the State Attorney of the USSR, July 22, 1940.

^c Decision of the Supreme Court Plenum, reported by Vyshinskaia and Menshagin, *op. cit.*

volved in all these instances is less than twenty minutes, and a sufficient reason for tardiness is lacking, then the individual who is late or idle three times in one month or four in two is subject to responsibility as a truant.

From the commentators and the cases it is possible to gain some idea of the reasons for absence or lateness which are considered sufficient. These seem to fall into two large classes, one where the individual is physically unable to appear and the other where a conflict of duties is involved. The former is termed by one writer as instances of *force majeure*. These involve situations of illness, arrest, transport delays, great calamities. Not only his own illness but that of his wife or children may legitimately keep the worker at home, if he cannot make any emergency arrangement for their care. In a case sent back to the court by the Supreme Court Plenum in October, the matter of illness was indirect but relevant. With his wife in the hospital, the worker had to stay at home with two small children.

It was recognized from the day the June law was passed that transportation difficulties would be a serious factor in the situation. Suburban train schedules were reorganized to ensure commuters adequate time for reaching places of work; efforts were made to eliminate the systematic lateness of trains and buses which had resulted in the daily issuance of thousands of *spravkas* testifying to such lateness. But with all this activity transport continues to be the cause of absence and lateness most frequently mentioned. The cases indicate that inability to secure a return ticket is a legitimate excuse for a vacationer who fails to return to work when scheduled. The commentators warn, however, that not all cases of slowness of transport represent valid excuses. When trams, buses, trains are merely a little late, there is no sufficient reason for lateness since the worker must be expected to allow some extra time for coping with overcrowded transport. Where train wrecks, floods, fires or other disasters occur, making it physically impossible for the individual to reach his place of work, a sufficiency of reason is of course recognized. In the matter of arrest, the individual's detention is not considered a valid excuse for lateness or absence if the detention was the result of his committing a crime or an administrative mis-

demeanor. A case is cited of a worker arrested for selling goloshes at the market for speculator's prices.

Some of the instances of *force majeure* overlap the cases of conflict of duty. Thus, the worker who stays home to care for a sick relative or for children whose mother is taken ill is faced with the duty of observing labor discipline and the duty of fulfilling social obligations. In these cases the social duty has priority if it can be shown that there was no alternative remedy available. Similarly in case the individual gives a great disaster as his excuse, he must show that his services in putting out a fire and so on were essential. His civil duty also takes precedence over labor discipline when he is summoned as a witness by an administrative body or a court. It is evident that the factual situation involved in each instance must be carefully gone into by the courts.

In the Vyshinskaia and Menshagin article it is stressed that the establishment of guilt is essential for the existence of criminal liability for truancy. If a worker oversleeps because his neighbor, a practical joker, has set back the hands of the clock in his room, his resultant lateness or absence is not his fault. Nor can he be regarded as guilty of truancy if his work schedule was changed while he was on vacation and he was not notified accordingly. Guilt can be deliberate or can arise from carelessness. Each can be of two kinds. Deliberate truancy can be direct or indirect: in the first instance the worker knows he is being truant and wishes to be (he carouses all day or she goes to the next town to get a permanent wave, etc.); in the latter instance, the worker knows he might be late and though he does not wish to be nonetheless he consciously permits the possibility to develop. Careless truancy takes the form of "criminal self-confidence" or "criminal negligence." In the first instance, the worker recognizes the possibility of lateness, but hopes to overcome it (he gets up late, expects to get a taxi, fails to); in the second instance the worker is not conscious he is committing a truancy but in the circumstances he should have known (he thinks a certain day is his day off and stays home when he should be working). There is apparently a difference of opinion amongst the legal commentators as to the significance of these forms of guilt in relation to the size of the penalty. While Alexandrov urges that the courts must cease

differentiating between absences as malicious and non-malicious and that truancies are punishable equally whether deliberate or a result of carelessness, Vyshinskaia and Menshagin, writing several months later, state that an intentional truancy has a more malicious aspect and merits severer punishment than careless truancy, and urge the courts to use the leeway in size of penalty provided by the June law accordingly.⁴

The role of the courts in fulfilling the June 26 law is not limited to hearing cases and coming to correct decisions. The educational function which the courts can perform is frequently stressed, and the efficacy of certain court procedures over others in impressing upon the offender and upon the court audience the cause and significance of his offense is frequently illustrated. The state attorney, as the following brief bit of dialogue indicates, can point the issues.

State Attorney: You worked in a factory before the revolution?

K.: Yes.

S.A.: Who was the owner?

K.: Morozov.

S.A.: How many hours a day did you work for him?

K.: Ten, twelve.

S.A.: Did you play truant?

K.: No.

S.A.: Were you late to work?

K.: No. I was afraid of being fired.

BASIC CHANGES

It is evident from the extensive overhauling of Soviet institutions now in process that the USSR is not relying on deterrent legislation alone for attaining a stable labor force. Measures have been taken in recent months to get at the root causes of excessive labor turnover, and these should do much to ensure the effective operation of the June law. Differences in housing facilities, cultural opportunities, and availability of consumers' goods in various localities have been constantly diminishing, but have remained sufficiently pronounced in some instances to serve as legitimate factors in deci-

⁴ From June 26 to Oct. 15, 1940, almost one-third of the corrective labor sentences for truancy were for periods less than three months. The law allows up to six months. *Sovetskaia Yustitsia*, No. 22, November, 1940, Editorial.

sions to switch jobs. The tempo of eliminating such differences will undoubtedly be quickened by the Decree of January 9, 1941, which gives impetus to the manufacture of consumers' goods from local materials for local distribution, and provides for housing construction out of the profits of local manufacture. In long range terms the Soviet objective of eliminating the difference between town and country aims at a nationwide spread of the excitement and intellectual stimulus which many now find only in large urban developments. Meantime, it can be expected that stress will continue to be laid in the Soviet press upon the obligation of the individual to return to his home village and participate with the force of his new technical and political knowledge in making of it the kind of a place he wants to live in, rather than choosing the easier path of taking a job in a community already well developed.

Basic among the many measures adopted recently are those concerning the youth. In commenting upon the need for the June legislation, the trade union leader Shvernik had emphasized that of the working population whose job switching created a problem young workers had constituted a majority. Cases heard in court since June confirmed this fact. Out of 500 cases involving truancy and job quitting studied by the State Attorney of the RSFSR, eighty per cent concerned individuals under thirty years of age and almost the same proportion had fewer than three years continuous work experience. Many of those who had come from the countryside where mechanized agriculture rendered their services unnecessary, joined the ranks of industry without a clear idea of what their job entailed. Of the urban youth entering industry many had not acquired orderly habits of work. On October 2, 1940 a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR provided for the establishment of new vocational schools in which a million youths annually will receive technical training and then work for four years in enterprises designated by the newly created Labor Reserves Administration.²¹ This not only reenforces the principle of a planned distribution of the labor force but creates the trained reserves of

²¹ For the text of the decree, cf. *American Review on the Soviet Union*, February, 1941, and for a discussion of the provisions, cf. *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, December 17, 1940.

labor essential to an expanding economy. "It will remake our industry," said a director of one of the new schools. "It is strange that we didn't do it sooner." ^{22*} The vocational schools will be bolstered in their efforts by the new emphasis in the whole school system on strengthening discipline, creating in the student respect for an orderly way of conducting himself, and broadening the student's approach to a choice of profession.²² In this the new tuition provisions, which Soviet authorities claim have already resulted in higher marks and a more serious attitude towards school work,²³ will play a part, as will the growing stress upon the role of the family in supplementing the schools' efforts to instil proper work habits and attitudes towards labor in young people.²⁴

The shortage of trained personnel will be offset not only by the vocational schools but by intensive training of outstanding workers in special technical schools. A new All-Union School of Technicians has been set up in Moscow and the two-year course of study to train technicians of twenty-three specialties began on January 27, 1941. All the students have had at least three years' experience in production. Many of them are famous Stakhanovites: Gudov, Busygin, Pichugina. Fifty-three are "congressmen," deputies to the federal and republic Supreme Soviets. In the six divisions of the school—mechanical, mining, metallurgical, chemical, energetics, and transport—their practical experience is to be reinforced with theoretical knowledge.²⁵ This new source of skilled personnel will tend to obviate the need for such laws as that of October 19, 1940

^{22*} Reported by Anna Louise Strong in "Watch Our Dust," *Soviet Russia Today*, March, 1941, p. 33.

²² The country's need for workers in certain occupations is to be regarded as one of the factors entering into this choice (*Pravda*, June 18, 1940). In Miss Strong's graphic description of the way the commissions functioned in selecting youth for the vocational schools it is clear that there is regard for personal predilections and capacities.

²³ Cf. VOKS report, 1941, "Introduction of tuition fees in higher educational establishments and senior classes of secondary schools of the USSR," pp. 7-8.

²⁴ Cf. "O Trudovom Vospitanii Detei v Seme," *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, Nos. 11-12, 1940. Self-reliance for boys includes sewing their own buttons and aiding in housework (for the USSR a noteworthy development). The importance of emotional stability in the young has also been stressed in the Soviet press. Cf. "Gigiena Shkolnika," *Izvestia*, Dec. 28, 1940.

²⁵ *Izvestia*, January 28, 1941.

permitting the commissariats to transfer engineers, skilled workers, and employees from one enterprise to another.^{25*}

Other aspects of this attempt to create conditions of work which will permit the new legislation to function and at the same time decrease the number for whom compulsion is necessary, include several significant changes of which only mention will be made here. The change now in process from the three to the two-shift day, made possible by the switch to the eight-hour day, is expected to permit the prompt repair of machinery and careful scheduling of deliveries and thereby avoid the stoppages which were a source of restlessness. The enlarged role assigned to the shop foreman is part of the whole movement to center responsibility and to use technically trained people in the shop rather than in the office. The emphasis on years of service (*stazh*) manifested in the recent decree which ended uniform treatment (*uravnilovka*) in the granting of aid for temporary disability has grown out of the need for rewarding the more stable workers and employees. The notorious practice of housewives, who had never worked or had worked intermittently, taking jobs when pregnant in order to gain paid maternity leaves after which they rarely returned to industry, had contributed to the disruption of production. The new law limits paid pregnancy leaves of 35 calendar days before and 35 after birth to those women workers and employees who have worked without interruption not less than seven months in the given enterprise.

It is evident that many of these measures will only reap their harvests in months to come. The Soviets do not expect an immediate solution of their problem. Among the resolutions adopted by the Eighteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party in February, it was stressed that truancy and job-quitting will be completely eliminated not as a result of a short campaign but by everyday education of the masses of the people.²⁶ Lateness and absence

^{25*} For text see April, 1941, issue of *The American Review on the Soviet Union*. Unlike the provision for compulsory transfer in effect from 1918 to 1921, there are now to be such money and other indemnities paid to individuals so transferred that enterprises will undoubtedly reduce to a minimum the transfer of personnel under this law.

²⁶ In this connection it is of some importance that the Conference decided that the attention of the Communist Party must be given to industry, equally with agriculture.

are to some extent concomitants of the values which the Soviet worker is taught to seek. In a day crowded with courses for raising technical and cultural qualifications, with meetings, discussions, social work, it is the wise worker who can budget his time so that his pursuit of the well-rounded life does not lead him to curtail his work-day. He will be aided in this, however, by new rules forbidding social work and meetings during working hours and by a rearrangement of the working hours of communal enterprises. Thus, in Moscow, hairdressers and public baths will remain open until after midnight and on Saturdays and Sundays as well. The rationalization of work processes which characterizes Stakhanovism must now be applied by the individual to his own schedule of activities because the importance attached to the proper utilization of his time grows ever greater. The social penalties for violation of labor discipline will, with a public opinion educated to a serious view of these matters, no doubt exceed in deterrent value the penalties provided by law. This is to some extent already evident in the recent enunciation of the incompatibility of violation of labor discipline with membership in the Communist Party or with the honor of the title Stakhanovite.

R.M.S.

SOVIET ECONOMY: 1941

A SUMMARY OF RECENT REPORTS

The February All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union¹ and the Eighth Session of the Supreme Soviet gave the first comprehensive review of economic activity in the USSR since the Eighteenth Party Congress in March, 1939 when the estimates for the third Five-Year Plan were outlined. As is the practice at Party conferences, attention was centered on the shortcomings of past performance and on plans for the future. It was also brought out to what extent international developments have necessitated changes in the economic plans of the country. As Chairman of the State Planning Commission Voznesensky said in his report on the plan for 1941, it is a war of motors, requiring high technical skill, oil, non-ferrous metals; it is a war of economic reserves. "If we don't want any accidents to take our people by surprise—we must keep our powder dry and not be sparing of the means of production assigned to the output of airplanes, tanks, armaments, naval vessels and munitions." The defense appropriation of 70.8 billion rubles, or 32.9 percent of the total, retained the high proportion assigned to the army and navy last year, but did not increase it, as has been the case in the last few years. (1940 preliminary returns show that 56.1 billion were spent on the armed forces—or 32.4 per cent of the total.) Emphasis on expanding production facilities expressed in the distribution of capital investment as between producers' and consumers' goods further underscored the changes wrought in the third Five-Year Plan by the war.

¹ Party conferences, according to Article 37 of the Rules of the CPSU adopted in 1939, are to be held in the interim between Congresses at least once a year and the recent conference was originally scheduled for last June, but postponed because the late spring necessitated special concentration on agricultural work. The purpose of these conferences is to discuss particular questions that arise concerning the general policy of the Party.

EIGHTEENTH ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF THE CPSU

The Party Conference, convened to consider problems of industry and transport, heard and discussed two main reports—that of Malenkov, secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU,² on the tasks of Party organizations in the fields of industry and transport, and Voznesensky's report on the plan for 1941. While indicating that Soviet economy was not without its substantial gains in the last two years, Malenkov's object was to discuss in considerable detail, naming names and citing facts, the deficiencies and lapses in performance. The situations which he described, and the measures recommended to deal with them, were summarized in the draft resolutions presented to the conference for approval and adopted as a program for combating shortcomings of economic organization. The resolutions were divided into four sections: successes and shortcomings in the work of industry and transport; reasons for the deficiencies in the work of the commissariats and the Party organizations in industry and transport; economic-political tasks of Party organizations in industry and transport; organizational tasks of Party organizations in industry and transport.

I. Achievements and Inadequacies in Industry and Transport.

Industrial production increased eleven percent in 1940 over 1939, and, especially in the last half of the year, some of the basic industries showed marked improvement in their output. The resolution credited the new labor laws with much of this improvement. On the other hand, despite the upturn, some industries did not fulfill their plans and others failed to carry out the schedules in all aspects—*i.e.*, in regard to cost of production; assortment and quality of products, etc.

II. Reasons for Weaknesses

The commissariats were criticized for a bureaucratic tendency to make decisions without checking on their fulfillment, and local bodies were criticized for not assisting the central commissariats in daily verification of the carrying out of orders. For their part, local Party organizations were reminded of their responsibility for per-

² There are four secretaries—Andreev, Zhdanov, Malenkov and Stalin.

formance of enterprises within their regional jurisdiction. The tendency to concentrate on problems of agriculture, to the detriment of industry, was deprecated because, in the view of the conference, the local and regional Party organizations were in a position to judge conditions in any given plant in a more objective perspective than the representatives of the commissariat directly concerned.

III. *Economic-Political Tasks of the Party Organizations*

1. First of all it was regarded as essential that Party organizations give the closest attention to problems of industry and transport.

The Party organizations up to this time have given their chief attention to the guiding of agriculture. And this was correct as long as the grain problem was not solved. But now, when the grain problem is solved in the main, along with the task of producing an annual grain crop of 7-8 billion poods—it is essential to turn the attention of the Party organizations toward industry and transport. This does not mean that attention to agriculture should be diminished. But it means that the Party organizations have grown³ sufficiently so that they can give equal attention to both industry and agriculture.

2. The local Party organizations must assist the commissariats in checking on the performance of enterprises within their jurisdiction. As was pointed out, it is impossible for the central offices of commissariats to keep in day-to-day contact with every plant under their control and it is accordingly part of the work of the Party to assist in such a check-up. This is directly in line with Article 61 of the Rules of the CPSU as revised in 1939, which reads:

³ The report of the Mandate Commission of the conference stated that the 457 delegates elected to the conference represented 2,515,481 members and 1,361,404 candidates to the Party, as against 1,588,852 members and 888,814 candidates at the time of the Eighteenth Congress in March, 1939. Of the delegates 71 per cent had secondary or higher education and 25 per cent were engineers. The length of their membership in the Party and the age distribution was given as follows:

<i>Party Membership</i>		<i>Age</i>	
Before 1917	5%	Up to 35	35.6%
1918-1923	15%	36-40	42.8%
1924-1928	45%	41-50	19.8%
1929 and since	35%	Over 50	1.8%

(Source: *Pravda*, February 19, 1941. For comparable data on delegates to Eighteenth Congress cf. *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, May 15, 1939.)

To enhance the role of the primary Party organizations of economic enterprises . . . and their responsibility for the condition of work of the enterprise, these organizations have the right of control over the activity of the administration of the enterprise.

The resolution goes on to enumerate the particular phases of management to which special attention needs to be given at the present time. These include precise and frequent inventory of supplies and raw materials on hand; full and proper utilization of instruments and raw materials; the careful protection and upkeep of machinery, buildings, etc.; prevention of the sale or trading of machinery and raw material supplies by factory management (a law against this practice was enacted February 10, 1941). This first group of questions reflects the fact that in Soviet economy, running at capacity, improper distribution of the means of production can create shortages of industrial supplies which cause unnecessary stoppages. The criticism was directed as much against the accumulation of excessively large stocks of raw materials and machinery in given plants as against the danger of allowing supplies to get too low.

The second group of points to be watched relate to the technological process of production to achieve an even daily rate of output, instead of the fluctuation common in Soviet industry where a peak is reached at the end of each month after a slump in the first two weeks; stress on quality of products (a law of July 10, 1940, made plant managers legally responsible for the quality and assortment of goods); development of more advanced industrial techniques; and the lowering of production costs through more regular and efficient production routines.

The last set of problems to be met relate to personnel. Greater attention is directed toward the proper maintenance of wage levels, to abide by the principle of "material encouragement to those who work well" on the basis of piece rates, premiums and higher pay for skilled labor. It was pointed out, for instance, that in some mines there was an incorrect practice of paying more for above-ground work than under-ground work. The resolution emphasizes that differential pay should be the strongest stimulus to increasing the productivity of labor.

Other labor provisions involve enforcement of the June 26 labor

laws;⁴ reinforcement of individual responsibility and authority of directors of enterprises and of the foreman (*master*) in the shop; increased participation in the production process directly by engineers, which calls for transferring a large proportion of the engineering force from the office to the factory. Along these lines, the resolution recommends a new system of requiring all graduates of higher educational schools (who specialize in industrial professions) to pass through an apprenticeship in the factory, first as assistant to the foreman, then foreman and finally engineer in the shop.

IV. *Organizational Tasks of Party Organizations*

Within the Party structure itself certain changes are envisaged. The local Party Committees of cities, krais, oblasts and republics in which there is industry are to have more than one special secretary on industry and transport—one for each branch of industry. Such provision will entail some amendment of the present Party organization, inasmuch as krai, oblast, and republic committees have only four or five secretaries, of whom one was assigned to cadres and one to propaganda. In the city committees there were three secretaries. Up to this time the practice apparently has been to have only one secretary concerned with the industrial problems of the area. Now there will be a secretary for each of the principal branches of industry and, where necessary, one for rail transport or water transport as the case may be.

These secretaries are obligated to keep in direct personal contact with the plants under their surveillance, and the Party is to make a point of knowing the administrative personnel in the plants, to be sure that people are retained in managerial posts *only* on the basis of their efficient performance, regardless of whether or not they carry a Party ticket.

Provision is made for developing the practical usefulness of meetings between the engineers, management and rank and file workers to discuss production problems, while backing for the Stakhanov movement remains in the limelight. Finally, a ban is put on all Party, trade union and social activities during working hours.

⁴ See pp. 11-32.

The long list of resolutions ends with the statement that:

Our industry was and is the base for the development of the whole economy. Industry was and is the leading factor in the whole system of economy. Industry advances our whole socialist economy, including agriculture and transport. Industry was and is the base of the defensive power of the country. In the present international situation very responsible work confronts our industry, in all its branches.

To this end the Party calls for maximum efficiency, initiative, and regularity in the management of industry and transport to assure complete plan fulfillment in every detail—by daily schedule, by individual plant, by quality and assortment of products, by cost of production. The co-ordination of initiative in working out new industrial processes with a strict routine and discipline in their application is the crux of the problem to be tackled.

None of the admonitions in the draft resolution are particularly new, when phrased in general terms, but the situation in which they are to be applied is new. The last Party Conference, the Seventeenth, was held nine years ago at the end of January 1932, and there too the resolutions called for better management, higher technical skill, less bureaucratic direction of industry by the central authorities. But at that time the aim was 9 million tons of pig iron, today it is 18; it was 9.5 million tons of steel, today it is 22.4; for 1932 the plan was 90 million tons of coal, for 1941 it was 191 million. In the field of administration, the 1932 conference approved the formation of commissariats of light and of timber industry and the reorganization of the Supreme Economic Council into the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. In contrast, the recent conference was considering an industrial apparatus so expanded and diversified that its administration is in the hands of twenty-four federal industrial commissariats. These statistical contrasts express a real difference in kind in the economy now in operation in the Soviet Union, for the increase of output is accounted for almost entirely by new plants, equipped with the most modern machinery. To speak of technical proficiency in 1932 meant something different from the highly skilled labor force now required to man the instruments of modern industry. Efficiency of management in the complex economic structure of mass production, where precise coordination is essential to uninterrupted opera-

tion, demands a far larger general staff of well-trained administrative personnel. The economic progress made from 1932 to 1941 indicates a degree of success in meeting these demands at the new technical level of industry.

1941 PLAN

The report by Voznesensky, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, on the results of 1940 and the plan for 1941 gave the current position of Soviet economy in which Malenkov's proposals must be applied. Introducing his speech with reference to the war, he said:⁵

The Soviet Union could not but take into consideration the technical-economic peculiarities of the present war, as well as other factors, and undertake measures to arm its economy with advanced technology and in general maintain the country at a level of necessary preparedness.

The policy of industrial expansion implicit in these words, as well as in the reiterated objective of catching up with leading capitalist countries in per capita production, is reflected in the statistics showing a 13.8 percent increase in production of means of production from 1939 to 1940 as against a 7 percent rise in consumers' goods.

The report on various branches of the economy showed that industry was a little behind the planned increase, due to poor performance in some of the basic industries: the annual rise in industrial production during the past three years was 13 per cent as against a planned 14 per cent. Agriculture, on the other hand, was doing very well, despite the unfavorable weather conditions. The 1940 grain crop was estimated at 7.3 billion poods. In summing up the year, Voznesensky saw the greatest economic potentialities for the future to lie in the trend noted in the closing months of 1940 toward considerably improved output in heavy industries: 46,000-47,000 tons of pig iron per day; 58,000-59,000 tons of steel; 467,000 tons of coal per day in the mines operated by the Coal Industry Commissariat; 97,000-98,000 tons of oil and gas. The second

⁵ For text, see Voznesensky, N., *The Growing Prosperity of the Soviet Union*. Workers Library Publishers, 1941.

economic potential lay in higher labor productivity, with the full utilization of the 15 per cent increase in working time as a result of the introduction of the forty-eight hour work week, and the improved labor discipline.

The 1941 plan reflects in some respects the changes that have been necessitated in the third Five-Year Plan by the war. Voznesensky outlined the principal objectives of the annual plan as first:

to strengthen the self-sufficiency of our economy and its independence from the capitalist encirclement, in order not to be dependent on capitalist economy, especially in metallurgy and machine-building. . . . The Imperialist war, having closed the markets in the majority of capitalist countries, underlines this need. In the 1941 plan this problem is resolved by forcing the increased production of special types of machines and rare metals, as well as by the program of construction of new plants, particularly for machine building and metallurgy.

Other objectives envisage a rounded development of the whole economy to prevent disproportion and to build up new reserves.

The plan continues to devote greater attention to expansion of production of means of production—a 23.5 per cent increase, as against 9 per cent expansion of production of consumers' goods. To reach the levels aimed at, Voznesensky again stressed in detail many of the points made by Malenkov regarding efficient use of existing productive capacities, as well as the extension of output of high-grade metals and the most complicated machinery, and introduction of advanced technological processes. Here also attention was called to the need of utilizing personnel to the maximum advantage, cutting down on overhead in the form of excessive office staff and using the differential wage system as stimulus to high productivity.

AGRICULTURE

Progress in agriculture during the past year was noted above, and of particular interest was Voznesensky's report on the successful development of grain production on the lower Volga and in Siberia, areas which have in the past been particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather. Drought prevention, through irrigation, and machine-serviced cultivation have together raised the harvest in the two areas 32 per cent and 88 per cent respectively above the record

pre-revolution year of 1913, and now the total is 33 per cent of Soviet grain output.

Credit for the steady improvement of yield is given to the new laws placing agricultural produce deliveries on a per hectare basis⁶ and limiting the private holdings of collective farmers. Livestock breeding also appears to be placed on a stronger footing through the requirements recently introduced regarding minimum livestock holdings by collective farms.⁷

It is interesting to note that differential earnings, according to plan fulfillment, are now being encouraged in agriculture, too. In the past, members of collective farms have received a share in the farm's cooperative earnings on the basis of the number of "work-days," the value of each "work-day" depending on the type of work. By decree of January 1, 1941 it has been recommended that collective farms in the Ukraine try out a system of supplementary pay, according to the results achieved. For instance, a farmer doing plowing will be paid not only the equivalent in "work-days" due for this kind of work, but if the yield on his section is above plan, he will receive a bonus. In this way, both quantity and quality of farm work will receive compensation, as is the case in industry.

For 1941 there is to be a 4 per cent increase in sown area, bringing the total to 157 million hectares of which 111.1 million is sown to grain; 12 million to technical crops; 11.4 million to vegetables and potatoes; 22.5 million to fodders. A considerable increase in the number of livestock is also called for.

TRANSPORT

In discussing transport, Voznesensky stressed its military importance.

The significance of railway transport for the USSR is as great as that of a fleet for a great sea power. . . . The military operations of the Red Army at the end of 1939 and beginning of 1940 showed that rail transport despite certain inadequacies could handle and certainly can now handle any mobilization requirements of our Red Army.

The transport plan for the current year can be carried out only

⁶ *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, July 5, 1940.

⁷ Decree of July 8, 1939.

by a considerable improvement of water transport to relieve the railroads of bulk freight. The canal systems—the Dneipr-Bug, the Moscow-Volga and the Mariisk route, joining Leningrad to Moscow, will facilitate this transfer. Further elimination of unnecessary cross-hauls is also necessitated.⁸

CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION

Investment in capital expansion is planned at one and one-half times that of 1940, with emphasis on heavy industries. It is of interest to note that even in the Central Asian republics capital investment is concentrated on the exploitation of local fuel, oil and metals resources. Some, naturally, also goes to further irrigation projects.

In the new Baltic republics where 1941 will see the first large-scale Soviet capital development, machine building, fuel, power development and textiles are to receive the lion's share. Investment in the Karelo-Finnish SSR is very greatly augmented, and Leningrad area which according to Molotov's 1939 report was not to have new plants under the third Five-Year Plan will experience industrial expansion by virtue of the fact that the "border near Leningrad has been altered and the safety of Leningrad greatly increased."

MATERIAL AND CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE

Voznesensky closed his report with a discussion of the effect of the industrial development on the people. He pointed out that the number of workers now is 30.4 million as against 27 million in 1937, and asked for a further addition to the ranks of 1.2 million in the course of 1941. The productivity of the workers is of course the key to further economic development, and toward this end Voznesensky reported a further extension of enrollment in the new labor reserve schools⁹ during 1941—350,000 in the Trades and Railway schools; 537,000 in the Industrial schools. From the latter 794,000 trained workers will go into industry during the current year. A twelve per cent increase in labor productivity is sought through further mechanization and rationalization. This compares with a 6.5 per

⁸ Cf. Mandell, Wm., "Soviet Transport," *American Review on the Soviet Union*, February, 1941, pp. 28-45.

⁹ Cf. *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, December 17, 1940.

cent increase in the average wage. The need for this differential is obvious, Voznesensky points out:

In order to develop their productive forces, the people must produce more in the course of the year than they use up in personal consumption. However, in absolute terms there is to be a sizable increase in output of consumers goods, as well. To facilitate this, an important decree was issued, January 9, 1941, to reorganize and expand production of articles of consumption on a local basis. It abolishes the former All-Union Council of Manufacturing Cooperatives (*Vsekopromsovet*), All-Union Council of Lumber, Chemical and Wood-Working Cooperatives (*Vsekopromlessoiuz*), and the All-Russian Union of Metal-Working Cooperatives (*Vsekoprommetallsoiuz*). Henceforth producers cooperatives will be supervised entirely by local councils of producers cooperatives and the local government bodies. In addition certain shops now attached to large plants to produce consumers goods from their by-products, scrap, etc., are to be turned over to local industry. The decree goes on to make available to local governments additional funds for the expansion of local industry and producers cooperatives, both through the banks and through the retention of additional government revenues. At the same time, enterprises working up local raw materials and waste products are freed from certain taxes.

The products to be manufactured by these small shops range from kitchen utensils and textiles, to rubber products, leather goods and furniture. In regard to the latter, all regions must manufacture their own furniture, as, with certain exceptions, furniture will not be permitted in what is the equivalent of "interstate commerce" after the middle of 1941.

The importance which is attached to this decree, both because of its provision for expanded output of consumers goods and for its guarantee of full utilization of all waste products and local resources, is evident in the requirement that both the government organs and the Party undertake to ensure popular participation in and responsibility for hastening the expansion of local industries.

Voznesensky closed his report with some discussion of the cultural appropriations and the results of the educational work reflected in school enrollments (in 1941/42, 36,200,000 are expected

in primary and secondary schools and 657,000 in higher education) and in the increase in the number of trained professional workers.

DISCUSSION OF REPORTS

In addition to the two main reports at the Party Conference, there were shorter speeches by the delegates, discussing the problems of their own industry or region. Among the most interesting of these were the speeches of delegates from the new republics, in which a plan has been in operation only during the last quarter of 1940. They reviewed what had happened to industry in the period after the World War when the Baltic states had been cut off from their Russian market and forced to become agricultural-producing centers for the west, importing most of their industrial materials and consumption goods. And they outlined the work now being done to restore industry, reopen factories, etc. For Latvia the chief lines for immediate development are the expansion of electric power, the development of local fuel supplies on the basis of the tremendous peat reserves, and the expansion of building materials industries, with the aim of giving Latvia a well-rounded economy and creating there within four or five years one of the leading industrial centers of the USSR.

In Estonia, also, industrial development and use of its important shipping center were stressed in the reports. In the last quarter of 1940 industrial output was up forty per cent as compared to the same period in 1939 and as a result of nationalization only 1.7 per cent of the total came from private industry. Chief complaint was directed against the terrible condition of the railways which had had little or no new equipment in the past decades.

The Lithuanian report gave more attention to agriculture as the chief source of income. However, there are industrial plans, calling for reorganization and amalgamation of small plants into larger in the lumber, sugar, dairy and construction industries.

EIGHTH SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

The 1941 Budget adopted at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet which opened on February 25 immediately after the close of the Party Conference gave substance to many of the plans outlined by Voznesensky. Zverev, Commissar of Finance, reported on the

preliminary returns for 1940 and on the current budget, at a joint session of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet.¹⁰ The figures for 1940 totalled 178.1 billion rubles income and 173.3 billion expenditure. These amounts, while more than twenty billion above 1939, were somewhat under the 1940 budget as adopted at the April, 1940, Session of the Supreme Soviet. Income, however, exceeded expenditures by 4.8 billion, compared with the 2.6 planned. The fall in income shown in the performance figures as against the original budget was largely in the turn-over tax; in expenditure it was spread fairly evenly in all categories.

In the 1941 budget, the income is to be derived as follows: 57.5 per cent from turnover tax; 14.4 per cent from share of profits; 4.6 per cent from social insurance; 1.2 per cent from machine tractor stations; 6.1 per cent from government loans; 5.8 per cent from taxes on the population. The expenditures are divided as follows: 33.8 per cent to national economy (18.2 per cent industry; 6.2 per cent agriculture; 3 per cent transport and communications) 22.2 per cent to social-cultural measures (12.3 per cent to education; 5.1 per cent to health; 4.8 per cent to social security); 32.9 per cent to Army and Navy; 3.3 per cent to administration and 1.6 per cent to loan service. In both these distributions the proportions are very much the same as in 1940.

Zverev reported a projected rise in the agricultural tax rates, in regard to the income tax on collective farms and the agricultural tax on collective farmers and individual farmers. The income tax would be increased from a flat 3 and 4 per cent to 4 per cent on income from sales to the government and 8 per cent on other income. Changes in the agricultural tax would increase the income norms on the basis of which the tax is computed. The increase will not be applicable in the new areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia or the Baltic states.

Successful operations of state insurance, the savings banks (there are now 14,000 branches, holding a balance of more than seven billion rubles), and the state loans were reported.

Zverev's estimates on expenditures put in concrete form the earlier discussions of industrial expansion. The capital investment

¹⁰ For abridged text, cf. *Soviet Russia Today*, May, 1941.

is estimated at sixty billion rubles of which 46.6 billion will come from the state budget and the rest from surpluses accumulated in the various industries. These sums will bring the total considerably above the original estimates for the third Five-Year Plan. Of the central budget appropriations to agriculture 2.5 billion will go to state farms and more than half, or 7.9 billion, to financing the machine tractor stations. The addition of 387 new M.T.S., including 115 in the Baltic states, will bring the total to 7,367. Zverev criticized the operation of both the M.T.S. and state farms on the grounds that they were not yet "highly profitable" propositions and that greater economy and efficiency in their management was necessary.

In the social-cultural field, education receives the greatest grant. The breakdown of this item, shows that the largest single appropriation (9.5 billion) remains in primary and secondary education—in which schools about 36 million children are expected in the next school year. A new appropriation of four billion goes to the new vocational schools, while appropriations for *VUZes* and *Tekhnikums* together come to 3.8 billion. Despite a slight decline in the grants to higher education, it is intended probably through the operation of the tuition system to increase enrollment to 657,000 in the higher educational institutions (*VUZ*). Allotments for scientific research are well above 1940—1.65 billion of which one billion comes from the central budget and the remainder from industrial commissariats. The social insurance budget is 7.9 billion, of which 5.9 goes to pensions and insurance payments and the balance to the care of children and the management of sanatoria, rest homes, etc.

LOCAL BUDGETS

In regard to the budget allotments at the disposal of the republic and local governments, the appropriations to all except the RSFSR are somewhat above those of 1940. Zverev's report suggested a shift in the types of income passing directly into these budgets both in order to make the income less seasonal and to make local authorities take a greater responsibility and interest in local tax collections. To this end the share of income from M.T.S. and loans remaining in the republics will be decreased from fifty to twenty-five per cent, along with a similar decrease in share of agricultural taxes, while

the percentage of turnover tax retained by local authorities is to be increased.

The expenditures through republic and local budgets are as usual concentrated on education and health which receive 30.7 out of the 46 billion. In the economic field, industrial appropriation for local industry; agricultural appropriation especially for irrigation and soil amelioration; and construction grants for municipal economy and housing absorb the bulk.

The five new republics are receiving considerable financial aid in the 1941 budget. Together, they are to have 3.1 billion rubles out of 46 billion, half for purposes of reconstructing local industry, and half to provide schools and health facilities.

The discussions in the Supreme Soviet following Zverev's submission of the draft budget brought out certain suggestions for changes which were embodied in the final budget estimates. These concerned for the most part matters of local significance such as road building and municipal improvements. The speeches also re-emphasized the great importance of correct financial operations in maintaining a system of checks in the economy and providing criteria for judging the efficiency of management. Zverev made it very clear that the organization of the Commissariat of State Control in no way diminished the function of financial "control by the ruble."

That the 1941 plan calls for a tightening up of concentration all along the line is clear from the schedules set: 17-18 per cent increase in the gross output of industry, including a 26 per cent rise in machine building; a 12 per cent gain in labor productivity and 3.7 per cent cut in production costs. Performance since the middle of 1940 gives promise of their fulfillment. Steel output in December was 17 per cent above that in May, and contrary to the usual curve of Soviet production, the first quarter of 1941 continued the levels of the last quarter of the preceding year. The increase in plant capacity to be brought into production this year with the completion of projects under construction last year may well result in a sudden sharp upward turn in production graphs such as was witnessed in certain years of previous Five-Year Plans when the wheels of new large productive units began to turn.

H. M.

STATISTICS ON THE SOVIET UNION

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1938 ^c	1940	Plan 1941
Population of the USSR (millions).....	139.3 ¹⁰	147.0 ¹	165.7 ²	...	170.5 ¹³	193 [*]	...
including urban (millions).....	24.7 ^{2*}	26.3 ¹	40.3 ²	...	55.9 ¹³
Number of Workers and Employees (mil.)	11.2	11.6	22.9	27.0	28	30.4	31.6
National Income (billion rubles 1926/27 prices).....	21.0	25.0	45.5	96.3	105	125.5	...
Budget Expenditure*—Total (mill. rubles)	...	6,670.4 ¹⁴	30,283.0	93,921	123,996	173,259	216,052
To National Economy.....	39,333	51,709	57,110	72,875
To Education.....	15,300	18,774	22,682	26,612
To Health.....	6,827	7,608	9,379	10,891
To Defense.....	17,481	23,151	56,102	70,865
To Administration.....	4,948	9,622	6,752 ²	7,142 ^{2*}
Savings Deposits (million rubles).....	...	335.8	1,411.9 ⁴	3,500 [*]	5,000 [*]	7,000 [*]	8,200
<i>Industrial Production</i>							
Electric Power (bill. kw. hrs.).....	1.9	5.0	13.5	36.4	39.6
Coal (million tons).....	29.1	35.5 ³	64.7	127.1	132.9	164.6 [*]	191
Oil and Gas (million tons).....	9.2	11.7 ³	22.3	30.6	32.2	34.2 [*]	38
Peat (million tons).....	1.7	5.3	14.8	24.9	26.5	...	39
Pig Iron (million tons).....	4.2	3.3	6.2	14.5	14.6	14.9 [*]	18.0
Steel (million tons).....	4.2	4.3 ³	5.9	17.7	18.0	18.4 [*]	22.4
Rolled Steel (million tons).....	3.5	3.4 ³	4.3	13.0	13.3	12.8 [*]	15.8
Aluminum (thousand tons).....	0	0	0.9	37.7	56.8	59.9 [*]	99.4 [*]
Copper (thousand tons).....	31.1	35.5 ³	45.0	100.7 [*]	103.2	166.2 ^c	216.7 ^c
Automobiles and Trucks (thousands).....	0	0.7 ³	23.9	200.0	211.4
Including Trucks (thousands).....	0	0.7 ³	23.8	171.5	184.4
Locomotives (units).....	664	479	827	1,214	1,626
Freight Cars* (thousands).....	14.8	10.8 ³	23.1	66.1	49.1
Tractors (thousands).....	0	1.3 ³	50.6	80.3
Combines (thousands).....	0	0	10.0	43.9	22.9
Metal Working Lathes (thousands).....	1.5	3.8 ³	18.1	36.1	53.9

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1938	1940	Plan 1941
Cotton Textiles (million linear meters)	2,224.0	2,778.0 ^a	2,694.0	3,447.0	3,491		
Woolen Cloth (million linear meters)	103.0	93.2 ^a	88.7	110.8	114.0		
Linen Cloth (million linear meters)	176.8 ^a	133.6	285.2	272.2		
Silk Cloth (million linear meters)	13.0 ^a	21.5	58.9	58.9		
Knit Goods (million pieces)	39.0	156.6	170.0		
Socks and Stockings (million pairs)	208.0	409.1	440.0		
Shoes ^a (million pairs)	36.2	...	94.5	205.9	213.0		
Including Leather Shoes (factory made)	8.3	29.6 ^a	84.7	164.3	...		
Paper (thousand tons)	197.0	284.5 ^a	479.0	831.6	834.1		
<i>Public Health</i>							
Hospitals, Number of Beds (thousands)	175.5	246.8	410.8	618.1	672.0*	840.0	...
Number of Physicians (thousands)	19.8	63.2	76.0	105.6	110.0	120.0	145.0
Sanatoria and Rest Homes (not incl. those for children), Number of Beds (thous.)	445.0	...
Number of Places in Permanent Creches (thousands)	0.55	62.0	600.9	748.2
<i>Education—School Enrollments^a</i>							
Primary and Secondary (thousands)	7,896.2	12,068.2	21,397.2	29,562.0	31,517.4	35,000.0	36,200.0
Higher Education Institutions (thousands)	112.0	176.6	504.4	547.2	602.9	619.9 ^a	657.0
Tekhnikums and Other Secondary Tech- nical Schools (thousands)	35.8	206.3	723.7	862.5	951.9
Factory Schools (F.Z.U. and other apprentice- ship schools) (thousands)	93.2	272.6	958.9	224.3	242.2
Newspapers printed (number)	859	1,197	7,536	8,521.	8,550	9,000*	...
Circulation (millions)	2.7	9.4	35.5	36.2	37.5	38.0 ^{a,1a}	...
Magazines, Number of Titles (thousands)	1.3	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.8
Annual Circulation (millions)	303.1	317.6	250.2	257.2
Books, Number of Titles (thousands)	26.2	34.2	51.0	37.4	40.0	43.8 ^a	...
Number of Copies (millions)	86.7	265.0	548.6	673.5	692.7	701.0 ^a	...
Theatres	153 ¹⁰	...	551 ^a	697	702	825	...
Cinemas	1,412 ¹⁰	7,331.0	27,138	28,345	28,574	30,919 ^a	...

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1938	1940	Plan 1941
<i>Agriculture</i>							
Number Collective Farms (July 1—thous.)	0	57 ^a	224.6 ^a	...	242.4
Number of State Farms	0	1,407	4,337	3,992	3,961
Number of Machine-Tractor Stations	0	158 ^a	2,115	5,818	6,358	6,980	7,367
<i>Percentage Collectivized</i>							
Farm Households	0.1 ^a	1.7	61.5	93.0	93.5
Sown Area	...	2.3	77.6	99.1	99.3
<i>Sown Area^b</i>							
In State Farms (thousand hectares)	...	1,735	13,448	12,163	12,411
In Collective Farms (thous. hectares)	...	1,400	91,533	115,980	117,200
In Collective Farmers' Gardens	...	1,200	2,505	5,021	5,300
In Individual Farms	...	108,700	26,949	1,075	900
<i>Sown Area—Total</i> (million hectares)	105.0	113.0	134.4	135.3	136.9	151.1 ^c	157.0
To Grains	94.4	92.2	99.7	104.4	102.4	110.9 ^c	111.1
To Technical Crops	4.5	8.6	14.9	11.2	11.0	11.8 ^c	12.0
To Vegetables and Potatoes	3.8	7.7	9.2	9.0	9.4	10.1 ^c	11.4
To Fodder	2.1	3.9	10.6	10.6	14.1	18.1 ^c	22.5
<i>Livestock</i> (million head)							
Horses	35.9 ^a	33.5	19.6	16.7	17.5
Cattle	60.6 ^a	70.5	40.7	57.0	63.2
Sheep and Goats	121.2 ^a	146.7	52.0	81.3	102.5
Pigs	20.9 ^a	26.0	11.6	22.8	30.6
<i>Agricultural Production</i>							
Milk (thousand tons)	20,558.0	...	28,861.0
Wool (thousand tons)	69.0	...	133.0
Grain (million centners)	801.0	793.2	698.7	1,202.9	949.9	1,195.8	1,291.46
Raw Cotton (million centners)	7.4	...	12.7	25.8	26.9	25.2 ^c	...
Sugar Beets (million centners)	109.0	101.4	65.6	218.6	166.8	210.0 ^{as}	...

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1938	1940	Plan 1941
Potatoes (million centners)	233.1	456.3 ^a	492.5 ^a	656.3	419.6	671.4 ^{ab}	...
Flax Fibre (million centners)	3.3	...	5.0	5.7	5.5	6.4 ^{ab}	...
Tea (thousand tons)	0.55	1.06	1.6	27.2	35.6
<i>Food Products</i> †							
Meat (thousand tons)	2,294.0	...	3,607.0
Sausage and Smoked Meats (thous. tons)	60.0	...	75.3	368.6	395.0
Fish (catch) (thousand tons)	1,018.0	956.4 ^a	1,333.0	1,608.9	1,560.0
Fats (animal) (thousand tons)	...	82.1	71.6	185.2	197.7
Fats (vegetable) (thousand tons)	409.7	495.3
Bread and Bakery Products (thous. tons)	8,065.0 ^a	19,131.0	16,600.0
Granulated Sugar (thousand tons)	1,346.8	1,333.1	828.2	2,421.1	2,519.5
Refined Lump Sugar (thousand tons)	437.8	1,032.2
Confectionery (thousand tons)	70.0	118.4 ^a	510.5	921.4	1,030.0
Citrus Fruits (Georgia) (million pieces)	...	2.0	12.7	293.5	250.3	325.0 ^a	...

* Approximate. ^a 1928 and 1932 breakdown omitted because categories not comparable to succeeding years. ^b Not including Commissariat of Internal Affairs. ^c Computed from percentages mentioned by Voznesensky, Feb., 1941. ^d Not including galoshes and felt boots. * Two-axle units. ^f Industrial production figures for 1938 are preliminary. ^g School years begin in Fall of year indicated. ^h Not including gardens of workers and employees which totaled 1.1 million hectares in 1938.

† Except for meat, the figures for food products include only output of the Commissariat of Food Industry.

1.—1926; 2.—1933; 3.—1927/28; 4.—1935; 5.—1929; 6.—1930; 7.—1918; 8.—1934; 9.—1916; 10.—1914; 11.—1915; 12.—1936; 13.—1939.

14.—1914-15; 15.—1928-29.

(Tons are metric tons (2204.6 lbs.); Centner = 220.46 lbs.; Hectare = 2.471 acres)

For additional statistics on Transport, see Mandel, Wm. "Soviet Transport," *American Review on the Soviet Union*, Feb., 1941.

For additional statistics on Population, see *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, July-October, 1939, and November, 1940.

For additional statistics, see also, "That Soviet Standard of Living," *American Quarterly of the Soviet Union*, April, 1940.

Principal Sources: SSSR i Kapitalisticheskie Strany, *Kulturnoe Stroitelstvo*; *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, Nos. 5, 8, 1939; *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo* SSSR, 1936 and 1939; *Sotsialisticheskoe Selskoe Khoziaistvo*, *Statisticheskii Sbornik*; Voznesensky, *Economic Results of the U.S.S.R. in 1940 and the Plan of National Economic Development for 1941*; Zverev, Budget Speech, 1941; Stalin, Speech, 1939; *Itogi Vypolneniia Vtorogo Piatiletнего Plana*.

SOVIET SCHOLARSHIP AND TOLSTOY

By

ERNEST J. SIMMONS*

During these agitated times scholarship would seem to be the last refuge of noble or ignoble minds. It is a labor that thrives only in periods of peace, and because of its limited appeal, the end-products require extensive subsidization for publication and distribution. In the humanities especially, scholarship is regarded at best as a necessary evil in our pragmatic world. The great French teacher Gaston Paris once said that the only justification of scholarship was its indefatigable search for truth. But truth was never a commodity on the world market; it seems to emerge fitfully by a kind of conspiracy of truth-seeking idealists, only to be suppressed again as unprofitable in a society whose members are preoccupied with personal aggrandizement.

Over the last twenty years in Soviet Russia scholarship in the humanities has been considered a necessary part of the total process of cultural development. (The same may perhaps be said of the other disciplines, but I have competence only in the humanities.) In the multitudinous foreign writings on the accomplishments or lack of them in Soviet Russia, very little has been said on this subject, perhaps because of its specialized nature or because the facts are not easy to obtain in a week's visit or by reading a book. It is surprising that a nation straining every effort to build a new civilization should encourage widespread activity in such a forbidding field as scholarly research. In the tremendous impetus, however, that has been given to the furtherance of all the arts, the scholar's search for the truth that lies behind has been deemed a public service and has been dignified by government support.

Before the Revolution there were brilliant scholars in Russia and many outstanding studies were produced in bibliography, literary criticism, textology, editions, and scientific biography. But scholarship in the humanities then was hindered in many ways. It is perhaps not paradoxical to offer as evidence of a lack of support the fine gesture made as early as 1857 by the Petersburg literary

* Prof. Simmons is writing a book on Tolstoy in which he is using many of the new materials from the Soviet Union.

circle, with Druzhinin and Tolstoy in the lead, to establish a Society to Assist Needy Authors and Learned Men. (The separation of literature and the scholarship that endeavors to study and interpret it has been less marked in Russia than in any other country.)

To obtain exact figures for the following assertion would be difficult, but I venture the guess that nearly as many titles in literary scholarly research have been published in the last twenty years in Soviet Russia as appeared in the previous fifty years. The principal reason for this scholarly renaissance, of course, has been enthusiastic government encouragement and financial aid. Apart from ready recognition manifested by public honors, the scholar is not lacking in material rewards. Only an enlightened public interest can account for the fact that profound scholarly investigations go into more than one large edition, and it comes as a surprise to us that learned articles in professional journals are actually paid for.

Another factor that has served to revolutionize Soviet studies in the humanities has been the tremendous emphasis placed upon the collection of new materials. After the Revolution, the vast archives of the old government were made accessible to investigators, and a quantity of fresh material, particularly from the archives of the secret police, became available. For very few writers of nineteenth-century Russia escaped the strict surveillance of the Tsar's police, and much data was compiled and filed away. The same may be said of the Censorship Commission, in whose files were buried many illuminating reports on the mangled works of authors.

In a steady stream, exhaustively edited collections of the productions of Russia's greatest writers and of many of the lesser figures have been appearing, augmented frequently by freshly discovered material. A new school of textology has developed whose adherents have been subjecting hitherto unquestioned texts to scientific analysis that has yielded astounding results. The literary section of the Academy of Sciences has fostered a series of *Letopisi*, "Annals" of the life and works of Russian authors. These extensive compilations aim to provide scholars with all the biographical, literary, and critical facts that will serve as vital source material for succeeding studies. They are, in a sense, complete reference works, and to date such compilations have appeared for Dobroliubov, Herzen, Chernyshevski,

Tiutchev, Nekrasov, Dostoevski, and Tolstoy. All possible archives, and the homes, villages, towns, and cities where famous authors lived have been thoroughly searched for literary treasures. A recent find was made in the hut of a family servant that turned out to be literally papered with old manuscripts, documents, and letters of the great satirist, Saltykov-Shchedrin.

Nor have studies and translations of foreign writers been neglected by Soviet scholars. Over the last few years translations and studies have appeared of *Beowulf*, the *Chanson de Roland*, Chaucer, and of the works of nearly all the later principal figures of Western European literature. To some tastes, indeed, Soviet scholars evince a tendency to be too exhaustive in their efforts, a fact that has not gone uncriticized in the USSR. In a single volume of the four-volume edition of Pushkin's letters, for example, a hundred pages of letters receive five hundred pages of closely printed notes that literally represent an encyclopaedia for the few years over which the letters were written.

A noteworthy example of Soviet scholarship has been the work done on Leo Tolstoy. Tolstoy presents a very complex scholarly problem, for the productions of no other major Russian writer were so persistently forbidden and mutilated as those of Tolstoy; and the fact that many of his works were irregularly published abroad or secretly printed has created numerous textual and editorial difficulties. Finally, the knowledge that a vast amount of unpublished material existed only served to accentuate the need of a definitive study.

The demand for a popular collected edition of Tolstoy was met in 1928, the centenary year of his birth. A twelve-volume edition, designed for the general public, was published in Moscow, and a fifteen-volume edition in Leningrad. The latter was more scientifically prepared; some of the texts were based upon the manuscripts, and a considerable amount of commentary was provided. Both editions were restricted to purely literary works.

At the same time a vast project was undertaken—the publication of a definitive “Academy Edition” of Tolstoy. A government decree set up a committee, and at the time a million rubles were appropriated for the work. The man whom Tolstoy designated as his

literary executor, his close friend V. G. Chertkov, was appointed editor-in-chief by the government.¹ A group of the most distinguished scholars in Russia agreed to serve on the central editorial committee, and a host of specialists were engaged to perform various aspects of the work.

All this may seem to be excessive preparation for a definitive edition of one man's works, but a few figures will indicate the extraordinary magnitude of the task. Tolstoy lived to be eighty-two, and in the more than sixty years of his writing career his productivity was simply colossal. There are over 2000 titles in the complete corpus which consists of almost a million manuscript pages. His letters alone total some 10,000.² With all this material, it was necessary to plan for an edition of ninety-five volumes.

The committee first drew up a careful *Prospectus*³ and laid out a strictly scientific editorial policy. The *Prospectus* calls for publication of the whole corpus in three series, arranged, with minor exceptions, chronologically; the first series of forty-five volumes will contain all the literary and journalistic writings, the texts based upon a study of the original manuscripts and variants, and full commentaries are to be provided; the second series of thirteen volume will consist of all his diaries and notebooks with commentaries; and the third series of thirty-one volumes will contain all his letters with commentaries. Three volumes of biographical material and indices will complete the edition, and the inclusion of numerous illustrations is planned. A very large amount of material in all three series has never been published before.

The first difficulty encountered by the committee was to complete and catalogue the Tolstoy manuscripts. Although there were two main collections already established (in the Moscow All-Union Lenin Library and the State Tolstoy Museum; later a collection was brought together in the State Literary Museum), many manuscripts were widely scattered in provincial museums, or were in private

¹ Chertkov died recently.

² It may also be added that about 50,000 letters to Tolstoy exist in the Russian Archives.

³ This has been published: L. N. Tolstoi, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii: Prospekt* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1929).

hands in Russia and abroad, principally in England. An appeal was circularized by the Commissariat of Education for the loan of these manuscripts, and the response on the whole was very gratifying. Various special work-catalogues of all this vast material were made, and soon the editors were busy on the separate volumes. Since the project got under way, thirty-nine volumes have been published,⁴ and many more are finished, waiting for the over-loaded Soviet press.

In the space here, it is impossible to give an adequate appraisal of the merits and defects of the thirty-nine volumes of the Academy Edition that have so far appeared.⁵ For such a grandiose project, one would expect better typography and designing, but these features are perfectly adequate if not distinguished. And the editorial work in certain volumes is open to criticism. Thus, in *Resurrection* (volumes 32-33), the editor N. K. Gudzi has handled an incredibly difficult task of establishing a final text by threading his way skilfully through a maze of variants and corrections in the original manuscripts, but in his conclusions he has failed to use some important materials. And in the *Letters, 1844-55* (volume 59), the commentary neglects a few items that would be of importance to a biographer, such as Nikolai Tolstoy's letter to Leo which tells of his sister's first meeting with Turgenev.

Although similar criticisms could be made of other volumes, it would almost be an act of supererogation in a task so formidable. On the other hand, the merits of the various volumes, from a scholarly point of view, are overwhelming. One cannot exaggerate the difficulties that faced the several editors in establishing the many texts. Tolstoy's habits of composition and his exasperatingly crabbed handwriting (often complicated by abbreviations) become crucial problems for the editors. The famous writer once said that no addition, however talented, can improve a work as much as a deletion, and in successive drafts he went over and over a production with a pruning pen. It is on record that he accumulated as many as thirty corrected variants of a single story, and on some occasions the final proofs had to be reset entirely, so completely had he altered the sheets. Even

⁴ Volumes 1-13, 17-20, 25-27, 32-33, 36, 38, 43-44, 46-47, 54-56, 58-59, 63, 72, 83, 85-87.

⁵ Detailed reviews may be found in *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo* (Moscow, 1935), No. 19-21, pp. 671-711; *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo* (Moscow, 1939), No. 37-38, II, 725-49.

then, telegrams were hurried off to the printer with last-minute corrections. All this made for great art, but it left a legacy of lament to his editors.

Such obstacles, along with the irregular publication of many of Tolstoy's works, have made it essential that the utmost care be taken with the texts. The result is that in not a few cases the final texts of the Academy Edition differ greatly from those the world has known. For example, the generally accepted text of *Anna Karenina* never received Tolstoy's final revision; he turned the proofs over to his friend N. N. Strakhov for smoothing out. The editor of the Academy Edition of the novel (volumes 18-20) has rejected this text entirely and established a new one incomparably closer to what Tolstoy actually wrote.

Apart from extensive textual revisions, the definitive edition has brought to light so many hitherto unpublished works, variants, and fragmentary compositions that we shall have to change considerably our whole estimate of Tolstoy's total production and of his worth as a great literary artist. To take just one example: the basic part of volume 17 contains two incomplete historical romances, *The Decembrists* and a novel on the time of Peter the Great. Much new material is here presented, and in the case of *The Decembrists*, one gathers the impression that Tolstoy had designed a novel on even a larger scale than *War and Peace*. In the two other series of the edition—the diaries and notebooks and the letters—the new material is still more abundant. Scores of notebooks and diaries and hundreds of letters are published for the first time.

Finally, the rich notes and commentaries to all these volumes reveal the profound scholarship and encyclopaedic knowledge of the editors. Literally all of Russian and much of Western European and American civilization is drawn upon in amassing reference material of unexampled scope. Such a huge undertaking as this edition is a public monument, and it redounds to the credit of the government that originated and supported the enterprise. Certainly, no more magnificent monument was ever designed for a great literary genius, and I know of nothing comparable to it in extent, completeness, scholarship, and accuracy in the world of letters.

The efforts of Soviet scholars on Tolstoy, however, have by no

means been limited to the Academy Edition. The mass of new manuscript material has provided infinite possibilities for new evaluations of Tolstoy as a man, a thinker, a critic, and a literary artist. An enormous number of studies in magazines and in book form on every conceivable aspect of Tolstoy have appeared since the Revolution. No attempt can be made here to review all these publications.⁶ Only a few of the recent and most outstanding works can be mentioned.

In the field of biography, apart from pertinent volumes already published in the Academy Edition, some very significant collections of source materials—reminiscences, diaries, and letters—have appeared. In the *Collection of the State Tolstoy Museum, The Annals of the State Literary Museum, L. N. Tolstoy*, and in a recent volume of *Literary Heritage*,⁷ a great many valuable items that shed much light on the life of Tolstoy are published for the first time.⁸

Of considerable biographical importance was the appearance in 1936 of the last of four volumes of the diaries of Tolstoy's wife.⁹ These volumes reveal much that is new on Tolstoy's life and works, but they are even more important for their information on the highly complicated question of the domestic tragedy that existed for many years in the Tolstoy household.¹⁰

Perhaps the single publication of most value for future biographical study is N. N. Gusev's *Annals of the Life and Works of L. N.*

⁶ For bibliographical details (incomplete), see *Tolstoi i o Tolstom*, Sbornik IV (Moscow, 1928), pp. 19-199; P. Popov, "Tolstoi i o Tolstom," *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo* (1939), No. 37-38, 11, 725-49; S. M. Breitburg, *Literatura o Tolstom poslednikh let* (Moscow, 1931); cf. also Predislovie, V. S. Spiridonov, *L. N. Tolstoi, Bio-Bibliografiia* (Moscow, 1933).

⁷ *Sbornik Gosudarstvennogo Tolstovskogo Muzeia* (Moscow, 1937); *Letopisi Gosudarstvennogo Literaturnogo Muzeia, L. I. Tolstoi*, red. N. N. Guseva (Moscow, 1938); *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo, L. N. Tolstoi* (Moscow, 1939), II, No. 37-38.

⁸ To these collections the earlier one, edited by M. A. Tsiavlovski, should be added. *L. N. Tolstoi, Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Moscow, 1927).

⁹ *Dnevnik S. A. Tolstoi, 1910*, red. S. L. Tolstogo (Moscow, 1936). The other three volumes, containing her diaries from 1860-1909, were published in 1928, 1929, and 1932. The first, second, and fourth volumes have been translated into English.

¹⁰ Of similar consequence for the relations of Tolstoy and his wife is the fine complete edition of her letters to her husband: S. A. Tolstaia, *Pisma k L. N. Tolstomu, 1862-1910* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1936).

Tolstoy.¹¹ Gusev was Tolstoy's secretary for the last two years of the author's life, and he is perhaps the greatest living authority on Tolstoy's biography.¹² What Gusev has attempted to do in this vast compilation is to draw up a chronicle of Tolstoy's life day by day over the entire eighty-two years of his existence, listing all the wealth of facts, events, and writings. His selection of significant material is almost impeccable, and the vast store of references attests to Gusev's tremendous erudition in the field. His book will be the standard reference work for all future investigations of Tolstoy.¹³

In the field of critical and literary investigation, some of the most illuminating studies on Tolstoy are to be found in periodicals. V. Vinogradov's extensive article, "On the Language of Tolstoy," is a brilliantly successful attempt to apply philological methods to clarify the diverse elements that contribute to Tolstoy's literary language. And P. Popov's article, "The Style of the Early Tales of Tolstoy," amounts to much more than a study of style; the article contains new information and some interesting speculation on the whole problem of the composition of *Childhood* and *Boyhood*. An entirely different field is covered by Lukach in his article, "Tolstoy and the Development of Realism." Lukach successfully attempts to show that the explanation of Tolstoy's literary greatness is to be found in an analysis of the historical conditions expressed in his productions.¹⁴

¹¹ *Letopis zhizni i tvorchestva L. N. Tolstogo* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1936).

¹² Only the first two volumes of his fine biography of Tolstoy have appeared, *Zhizn Lva Nikolaevicha Tolstogo* (Moscow, 1928-29).

¹³ Some mention should be made of other important biographical material: *Tolstoi i Turgenev. Perepiska*, red. A. E. Gruzinskogo i M. A. Tsiavlovskogo (Moscow, 1928); *Pisma Tolstogo i k Tolstomu* (Moscow, 1928); *Perepiska. L. Tolstoi i V. F. Stasov, 1878-1906*, red V. Komarovoi i V. L. Modzalevskogo (Leningrad, 1929); *Perepiska. L. N. Tolstoi i N. N. Ge, 1884-1894* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930); D. P. Makovitski, *Yasnopolianskie zapiski* (Moscow, 1922-23), I-II; T. A. Kuzminskaia, *Moia zhizn doma v Yasnoi Poliane* (Leningrad, 1925-6), I-III; A. V. Goldenveizer, *Vblizi Tolstogo* (Moscow, 1922-23), I-II; I. E. Repin, *Dalekoe-blizhoe* (Moscow, 1937); A. G. Rusanov, *Vospominaniia o L. N. Tolstom* (Voronezh, 1937); V. F. Bulgakov, *L. Tolstoi v posledni god ego zhizni* (Moscow, 1920); T. L. Sukhotina-Tolstaia, *Druzia i gosti Yasnoi Poliany* (Moscow, 1923); N. N. Apostolov, *L. N. Tolstoi i ego sputniki* (Moscow, 1928); *Zhivoi Tolstoi* (Moscow, 1928); V. I. Nevski, *Smert Tolstogo po novym materialam* (Moscow, 1929); E. Yaroslavski, *L. N. Tolstoi i tolstovtsy* (Moscow, 1938).

¹⁴ These three articles are in *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo* (1939), No. 35-36, I. Another very recent and highly suggestive article is that of N. K. Gudzi, "Zamysly Tolstogo i ikh voploshchenie," *Novy Mir* (Moscow, 1940), No. 11-12, pp. 290-302.

Among the most notable critical studies of Tolstoy in book form is Professor B. M. Eikhenbaum's *Leo Tolstoy*. Two volumes have already appeared ¹⁵ and a third is in the press. Against a biographical framework, Eikhenbaum critically examines all those factors that determine the development of Tolstoy the thinker and literary artist in the 1850's and 1860's. It is a most stimulating investigation, studded with original, often paradoxical, explanations of the origins of Tolstoy's thought and of the ideas and forms behind his productions. Much use is made of foreign literary influences, and although one cannot always agree with the more startling conclusions, it must be admitted that the author has opened whole new vistas in the historical comparative study of Tolstoy.

Professor N. K. Gudzi's book, *How Tolstoy Worked*,¹⁶ has aroused great interest. In it he makes wide use of the material handled by him in his editorial efforts on the Academy Edition, in order to show, by a special analysis of the numerous manuscripts of *The Power of Darkness*, *The Kreutzer Sonata*, *The Devil*, and *Resurrection*, just how Tolstoy worked, from the conception of a story to its final consummation. With patient erudition he takes the reader to the work-bench of a great artist's literary laboratory and presents a full-length and absorbing picture of Tolstoy's intense, tireless labor over his productions.

The latest study is L. Myshkovskaia, *L. Tolstoy. Work and Style*.¹⁷ Like Gudzi, Myshkovskaia is concerned with the creative process, but unlike him, she goes beyond the bounds of a purely empirical study. She concentrates on Tolstoy's creation of *Hadji Murad* and *Kholstomer*, and perhaps the chief contribution of the investigation, which has some serious lapses in scholarship, is the light it sheds on Tolstoy's use of historical sources and on his extraordinary devotion to veracity in historical fiction.

This survey of Soviet scholarship on Tolstoy is necessarily incomplete, but it will serve to give some idea of the enormous labor that

¹⁵ *Lëv Tolstoi, piatidesiatye gody* (Leningrad, 1928); *Lëv Tolstoi, shestidesiatye gody* (Leningrad, 1931).

¹⁶ *Kak rabotal L. Tolstoi* (Moscow, 1936).

¹⁷ *L. Tolstoi. Rabota i stil* (Moscow, 1929). This work adds little to a preceding book by the same author, *Rabota Tolstogo nad proizvedeniem* (Moscow, 1931).

is being expended on the study and interpretation of the works of Russia's greatest literary genius. And very many other famous Russian and foreign authors of the past are receiving comparable attention. With the vital encouragement and support of the government, scholarship has come into its own, and the enduring literary heritage of the past is being constantly reworked and kept alive for the edification of the present and of future generations.

THE PERMANENT COMMITTEES OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR*

By

A. VASILIEV

(Translated by Leda Swan)

At the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (January, 1938) both Chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, elected permanent committees: (1) on Legislation, (2) on the Budget, and (3) on Foreign Affairs. The experience that has been accumulated since then makes it possible to draw certain general conclusions about the nature and form of their work.

These committees were set up by the Chambers on the initiative of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.¹ Inasmuch as the Constitution does not determine the procedure of work of the Supreme Soviet, the election of this or that permanent or temporary committee depends solely upon the desire of the Chambers.

To clarify the matter of the work of the permanent committees of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, it is helpful to turn to two basic existing sources: the proposals of the deputies concerning the creation of permanent committees, and the actual work of these committees up to the present.

COMMITTEES ON LEGISLATION

Khrushchev, the deputy who introduced in the Soviet of the Union the proposal to organize a Committee on Legislation, pointed out that "... the Committee will have to do the preliminary work on this or that bill before it is debated and accepted by the Supreme Soviet." He was linking the question of careful drafting of laws

* Translated and abridged from *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 4, 1940.

¹ At the same time, Mandate committees and Inquiry and Auditing committees were elected by each Chamber, but they have a totally different significance. They are mentioned in the Constitution of the USSR and indicate a recognition of the right of the Supreme Soviet to exercise control over the fairness of the election of its members, to investigate any matter, and also to conduct an audit of the work of any organization or official of the Soviet Union.

to the objective of achieving stability of law which had been emphasized in the Eighth Congress of the Soviets of the USSR. "We must work carefully over the drafting of laws so that our laws will in the future ensure the permanence of the gains of the October socialist revolution. . . , " Khrushchev declared. A similar proposal was made at the meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities.

Of all the work performed by the Legislative committees to date, special attention is merited by their preparation for submission to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the bill entitled "The Judicial System of the USSR, Union Republics, and Autonomous Republics." This bill was introduced at the Second Session of the Supreme Soviet by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, but the committees of both Chambers had thoroughly studied every detail of the bill and had submitted their findings, in which general approval was expressed along with suggestions for changes and additions. These corrections were primarily editorial in nature, designed to make certain formulations more precise. But in some sections changes were suggested that affected the essence of the bill. Thus, for example, the bill (par. 20) permitted prosecution of People's Judges, as well as members of the District Courts and Supreme Courts of the autonomous republics, on the ruling of the Procurator (State Attorney) of the autonomous republic, sanctioned by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republic. The Legislative Committees proposed (and the Chambers approved the amendment) leaving this question to the competence of the Procurator and Presidium of the union republics.

The corrections, editorial and otherwise, which the Legislative Committee of the Soviet of the Union had proposed, affected twenty-seven paragraphs of the bill. Those proposed by the Legislative Committee of the other Chamber affected thirty paragraphs. As some of the proposals were identical, the committees together proposed in all thirty-seven amendments. The Chambers agreed with the changes in thirty paragraphs, and with these the Judiciary Act was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The Legislative Committee of the Soviet of the Union drafted and introduced for the approval of the Second Session of the Supreme Soviet a bill "On State Tax on Horses of Individual Farmers."

At the request of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Legislative committees also prepared a bill on recall of deputies, in accordance with Article 142 of the Constitution. In addition, the committees took the initiative in drafting a bill embodying the decision of the Eighteenth All-Union Congress of the Communist Party to introduce universal ten-year and seven-year education during the third Five-Year Plan.

Are all the bills introduced in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR subject without exception to a preliminary examination by the Legislative Committees of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities?

The answer, provided by actual experience, is in the negative. In the first place, legislation dealing with foreign affairs and finance-budget questions are handled by the relevant permanent committees of both Chambers. Thus, the bill on "Procedure for Ratification and Denunciation of International Treaties of the USSR," considered by the Second Session of the Supreme Soviet, had come from the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The bills on "Income Tax," on "Assessment for Housing and Cultural Construction Levied on Population Paying Income Tax," and on "Obligatory Insurance," introduced by the government for the approval of the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet, were examined by the Budgetary Committees of both Chambers.

Secondly, experience has shown that committee preparation of bills to be introduced in the Supreme Soviet does not prove necessary in all cases. Thus, for example, the bill on the All-Union Agricultural Exposition, introduced by a group of deputies, was examined and adopted by the Second Session of the Supreme Soviet without being referred to committees. The same was true of the bill on citizenship in the USSR, introduced by the government at the Second Session.

Thirdly, when the Chambers deem it necessary, they assign committee preparation of certain bills not to the permanent committees but to temporary ones created specially in each given case. This was true of bills on universal military service and on the agricultural tax introduced by the government at the Fourth Session.

Such procedural variations indicate the elasticity of the Supreme

Soviet's form of work. Summing up the above details, the duties of the Legislative Committees of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities can be formulated as follows:

1. Preliminary consideration and transmission of findings on bills referred to them by the Chambers of the Supreme Soviet.

2. Drafting of legislation upon their own initiative and presentation of it, in the name of the Legislative Committee, for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet.

3. Drafting of legislation at the request of the Chambers (this kind of request has in practice never yet been made) and also at the request of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

There is no doubt that the Committees on Legislation should play an important part in the huge task faced by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in making the legislation of the USSR conform with the Constitution, and in particular, in issuing all-Union codes: criminal, criminal-procedural, civil, civil-procedural, as well as in issuing federal legislation, establishing basic principles concerning the use of the land, basic principles in the spheres of education and public health, and principles of labor legislation (Constitution of the USSR, Par. 14).

BUDGET COMMITTEES

The election of the Budget Committees was proposed by the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for the purpose of ". . . subjecting the budget to a thorough investigation in all its items of income and expenditure, of organizing a systematic checkup of fulfillment of the various items; of providing a preliminary examination of the budget introduced for the approval of the Supreme Soviet. . . ."

Proposals to organize the Budget Committees were prompted by the extreme importance which the budget has in a socialist economy and the necessity in this connection for a detailed and thorough examination by the Supreme Soviet of budgets introduced by the government for its approval.

Up to the present, the work of the Budget Committees of both Chambers has taken the following form. The Budget Committees have subjected the 1938, 1939, and 1940 state budgets to detailed

preliminary examination.² As a result of the many-sided consideration of each item of income and expenditure, the Budget Committees of both Chambers submitted their findings and also gave associate reports to accompany the reports of the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR at the Second (August, 1938), at the Third (May, 1939) and at the Sixth (March-April, 1940) Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The findings of the Budget Committee consisted of three basic elements:

1. A general evaluation of the budget from the point of view of its accord with the policies of the Party, the Soviet government, and the existing laws.

2. Proposals for amendment of the budget.

3. A statement of shortcomings discovered by the Budget Committees in the system and practice of work of the People's Commissariat of Finance and other USSR commissariats in the matter of compiling and drawing up the budget, and, arising out of this, certain concrete comments and suggestions.

At all three sessions, the Budget Committees stated in their findings that the budgets introduced by the Council of People's Commissars corresponded fully to the policy of the Party and the Soviet government and were aimed to facilitate socialist construction, as well as to strengthen the security of the state.

The amendments to the 1938 budget, proposed by the Budget Committee of the Soviet of the Union, consisted in a partial rearrangement of income and expenditure and in the increase of income by 1,594.8 million rubles together with an increase of expenditure by 38.3 million rubles. Similar amendments to the 1938 budget, proposed by the Budget Committee of the Soviet of Nationalities, contemplated a 1,593.5 increase of income and a 14.7 million ruble increase of expenditure.

The Chambers, agreeing with the major part of the amendments, adopted the 1938 budget with a 1,553.8 million ruble increase in income over the budget proposed by the Council of People's Commissars, and with a 38.3 million expenditure increase.

² The same procedure was followed with the 1941 budget, presented to the Eighth Session in February.—*Ed.*

The amendments to the 1939 budget proposed by the Budget Committee of the Soviet of the Union resulted in a partial rearrangement of income and expenditure items, in an increase of income by 491.0 million rubles and a decrease of expenditures amounting to 152.6 million rubles. The amendments submitted by the Budget Committee of the Soviet of Nationalities recommended a 574 million ruble increase in income and 152.6 million ruble reduction in expenditure.

In agreement with all the amendments proposed by the Budget Committee of the Soviet of the Union and with most of the amendments proposed by the other committee, the Chambers adopted the 1939 budget with an increase in income of 491 million rubles and with a reduction of 152.6 million rubles for expenditures.

Similarly, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the 1940 budget with an increase in income, over the budget submitted by the Council of People's Commissars, of 1,368.7 million rubles and an increase of expenditures of 202.4 million rubles, in accordance with the amendments proposed by the budget committees, with an additional assignment of funds to enterprises favored by deputies in their remarks during the discussion of the budget in the Chambers.

The amendments to the 1938, 1939, and 1940 budgets proposed by the Budget Committees were a result of:

1. Discovering new sources of income.
2. Introduction of changes arising out of decisions made by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR after the budget had been given to the Budget Committees.
3. Satisfying the justifiable requests of various departments.
4. Making more precise the various accounts on the basis of the last year's reports as well as on the basis of information concerning the fulfillment of estimates for the period already elapsed in the current budget year.³
5. Correcting inaccuracies and lack of precision on the part of the People's Commissariat of Finance in determining the income and expenditure items.

³ The fiscal year runs from January 1 to December 31.—*Ed.*

In studying the budgets, the committees examined the methods of work of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR and other People's Commissariats in compiling and executing the budget and discovered a number of inadequacies. For instance, in the "Law on the Unified State Budget of the USSR for 1938," adopted by the Second Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in accordance with the Budget Committees' proposal there was noted the unsatisfactory organization of the collection of agricultural taxes and assessments in 1937 by the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR and its local bodies.

In their co-reports on the 1939 budget, the committees noted the unsatisfactory work of the savings banks in encouraging the people to place their savings in the banks, the insufficient effort made by many enterprises to eliminate waste, the inadequate study by the People's Commissariat of Finance of the economy of various union republics, the lack of coordination between various departments in the Finance Commissariat in planning the budget, the insufficient enforcement of financial discipline, etc. Accordingly, in the "Law on the State Budget of the USSR for 1939," passed by the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it was noted that "... the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR and its local bodies do not satisfactorily fulfill the task entrusted to them of exercising control over the correct and economical expenditure of state funds allotted to the People's Commissariats and other institutions and organizations." The Supreme Soviet directed the People's Commissariat of Finance and its local bodies "... decisively to improve the work of controlling the financial activity of People's Commissariats and other institutions and organizations, and strictly to observe finance and estimate discipline."

Studying the 1940 budget, the committees again discovered a number of shortcomings in the work of the Finance and other commissariats, namely, superfluity of personnel and administrative expenditures, carelessness, damage, considerable waste of raw materials, fuel, and wage funds, inadequate control by the People's Commissariat of Finance over the proper spending of funds, etc. Simultaneously with the study of the 1940 budget, the committees re-

viewed the report on the execution of the 1938 USSR state budget, issued findings, and proposed its ratification without change.

During the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Budget Committees of both Chambers examined and submitted their findings on the following bills introduced by the government: "Income Tax Law," "Assessment for Housing and Cultural Construction on Population Paying Income Tax," and the "Obligatory Insurance Law."

It has been proved, by analogy with other permanent committees, that the Budget Committees can draft upon their own initiative, and submit to the Chambers for consideration, legislative bills on finance-budget questions. On the basis of the above, the work of the Budget Committees can be formulated as follows:

1. Preliminary detailed examination and presentation of findings on the state budgets introduced by the government for the approval of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

2. Assistance to the Chambers of the Supreme Soviet in the exercise of control over the execution of the state budget of the USSR by means of: (a) a preliminary investigation and the presentation of findings on the reports concerning the execution of the budget, together with (b) an analysis of the methods of work of the People's Commissariat of Finance and other commissariats in the sphere of drawing up and carrying out the budget.

3. Preliminary study of finance-budget bills introduced in the Supreme Soviet and referred by the Chambers to the Budget Committees, as well as drafting bills on these subjects either upon their own initiative or upon assignment by the Chambers or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES

The proposal to create permanent Foreign Affairs Committees of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities was prompted by the extreme importance of problems of foreign policy which Article 14 of the federal constitution relegates to the competence of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. According to the intention of these proposals, the work of the committees is to assist the

Chambers in deciding questions of foreign policy and to help formulate these questions for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And this function the permanent committees on Foreign Affairs are indeed fulfilling.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities drew up and introduced at the Second Session of the Supreme Soviet the bill on "Procedure of Ratification and Denunciation of International Treaties of the USSR."

By analogy with other committees, the duties of the permanent committees on Foreign Affairs may be briefly defined as follows:

1. Assistance to the Chambers of the Supreme Soviet in exercising control over the conduct of foreign policy by the government of the USSR and in preparation of recommendations on questions of foreign policy for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

2. Preliminary study of bills concerned with problems of international relations, introduced in the Supreme Soviet and referred to the committees; also the framing of bills of this kind either upon their own initiative or upon assignment by the Chambers or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

* * *

This is the way the work of the permanent committees of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet is at present outlined. It is not impossible, of course, that in the process of development it may in the future be supplemented and become more complex. But the fundamental purpose of all the permanent committees is to assist the Chambers of the Supreme Soviet in the realization of their constitutional right to initiate legislation (Par. 38 of the Constitution of the USSR).

[The author then contrasts the work of these committee with the work of parliamentary committees elsewhere, pointing to differences in composition, reporting out of bills, etc.—*Ed.*]

(The remainder of this article, dealing with the procedures followed by the committees in their work, will be published in the next issue.)

DOCUMENTS



TREATY ON FRIENDSHIP AND NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia, inspired by friendship existing between the two countries and convinced that preservation of peace forms their common interest, decided to conclude a treaty on friendship and non-aggression and appointed for this purpose their representatives:

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—Viacheslav M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia—Milan Gavrilovitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Yugoslavia, Bozhin Simich and Colonel Dragutin Savich, which representatives, after exchanging their credentials found in proper form and due order, agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

The two contracting parties mutually undertake to desist from any aggression against each other and to respect the independence, sovereign rights and territorial integrity of the USSR and Yugoslavia.

ARTICLE II

In the event of aggression against one of the contracting parties on the part of a third power, the other contracting party undertakes to observe a policy of friendly relations towards that party.

ARTICLE III

The present treaty is concluded for a term of five years. If neither of the contracting parties finds it necessary to denounce the present treaty one year before expiration of the above terms, the treaty automatically will remain valid for the following five years.

ARTICLE IV

The present treaty comes into force from the moment of its signing. The treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of ratification instruments shall take place in Belgrade.

ARTICLE V

The treaty is drawn up in two originals in Russian and the Serbo-Croat languages, both texts being equally valid.

Moscow, April 5. On behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,

V. M. Molotov; On behalf of His Majesty King Peter, M. Gavrilovitch, B. Simich, Colonel Savich.

(Source: *TASS*, April 6, 1941.)

NEUTRALITY PACT BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, decided to conclude a pact on neutrality, for the purpose of which they appointed as their representatives:

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Viacheslav M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

For His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jusanmin, Cavalier of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, first class; and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the USSR, Lieutenant General, Jusanmin, Cavalier of the Order of the Rising Sun, first class, and the Order of the Golden Kite, fourth class—who, after the exchange of their credentials, which were found in due and proper form agreed on the following:

Article 1. Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party.

Article 2. Should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

Article 3. The present pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both contracting parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the contracting parties denounces the pact one year before expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

Article 4. The present pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokio also as soon as possible.

In confirmation whereof the above-named representatives signed the present pact in two copies, drawn up in the Russian and Japanese languages, and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Moscow April 13, 1941, which corresponds to the 13th day of the fourth month of the 16th year of Showa.

Signed by Molotov, Yosuke Matsuoka, Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.

DECLARATION

In conformity with the spirit of the neutrality pact concluded April 13, 1931, between the USSR and Japan, the governments of the USSR and Japan in the interests of insuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solemnly declare that the USSR pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchoukuo, and Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Moscow, April 13, 1941, signed on behalf of the government of the USSR by Molotov; on behalf of the government of Japan by Yosuke Matsuoka and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.

(Source: TASS, April 13, 1941.)



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The list of research projects which are currently under way has been issued in mimeographed form for the past two years by the American Russian Institute.

Since cross references have been avoided as far as possible in the present listing, students are advised to look through the entire list for studies related to their own work. In cases where the information was supplied, the name of the institution where the work is being done, the supervising professor, the degree for which the study is being offered and the use of Russian source material (R.S.) are indicated in the parenthesis following the title.

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Hrdlicka, Dr. Ales, "Catalogue of Crania of Alaska and Siberia." (Proceedings of the U. S. National Museum. R.S.)
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- Dana, Dr. H. W. L., "History of Soviet Drama." (R.S.)
Eppler, Ira, "Contemporary Soviet Art." (Univ. of Oklahoma, Prof. Jacobson, M.F.A., R.S.)
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- Linsley, Arthur R., "American Relations With the Baltic States, 1919-1920." (Stanford Univ., Prof. H. H. Fisher, M.A., R.S.)
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- Mosely, Philip E., "American Russian Relations, 1917-1922." (R.S.)
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- Crist, David S., "Russian Policy in Manchuria, 1892-1905." (Univ. of Michigan, Ph.D., R.S.)
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Newspapers are named primarily for convenient reference, although the same items may appear in other newspapers. The date given is the date on which the event occurred, while the number in parenthesis following the name of the newspaper indicates the date of the paper in which the report appeared.

(N.Y.T.—New York Times; N.Y.H.T.—New York Herald Tribune; D.W.—Daily Worker.)

* The texts of decrees, treaties, etc., referred to in the items marked with an asterisk are available in full at the office of the American Russian Institute.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

ADMINISTRATION

April

- 1—The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR opens its fourth session.—*D.W.* (2)
- 29—It is reported that the internal passport system has been instituted in the Baltic Republics in order to remove persons not engaged in productive labor from the cities which are now faced with a housing shortage, as the result of greatly expanded industry.—*N.Y.H.T.* (30)

May

- 6—Stalin replaces Molotov as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (the latter becomes Vice-Chairman), assuming for the first time the high post held by Lenin, 1917-1924, Rykov, 1924-1930, and Molotov, 1930-1941, and adding to the long list of government jobs he has held in the past: People's Commissar of Nationalities and People's Commissar of Government Control under Lenin, member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the federal Congress of Soviets and also of the RSFSR Congress of Soviets, member of the Council of Labor and Defense, deputy to the federal Supreme

Soviet and member of its Presidium, deputy to the various republic Supreme Soviets and member of the Presidium of each, etc., etc.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7)

ART AND SCIENCE

March

- 16—The third series of Stalin Prizes are awarded to workers in art, including Sholokhov, Aleksei Tolstoy, Shostakovich, and Eisenstein.—*N.Y.H.T.* (17)
- 19—Noted Soviet chemist, N. Kurnakov, dies.—*D.W.* (24)
- 23—Moscow reports that two Soviet flyers remained aloft in a balloon for nearly three days, smashing all international records for endurance and for long distance flights.—*D.W.* (24)

April

- 8—Ten Soviet scientists take off from an ice floe in the Polar basin north of Bering Strait after having drifted with the current for five days. Scientific studies were carried out as part of a program for improving the Northern Sea Route, an important Soviet commercial lane.—*D.W.* (9)
- 15—The All-Union Committee on Higher Schools confers the degree of Pro-

fessor of Histrionic Art on S. Mikhoels of the Moscow State Jewish Theatre and that of Assistant Professor of Histrionic Art on B. Zuskin of the same theatre.—*D.W.* (16)

16—The plane USSR N-169 for the second time in one month lands a crew of ten men on an ice floe 560 miles from Wrangel Island in the Central Arctic to continue scientific investigation.—*D.W.* (17)

24—Soviet aviators and scientists set up camp on an ice floe in the Polar Basin for the third time in one month.—*D.W.* (25)

May

1—The scientific party studying conditions in the high latitudes lands at Wrangle Island where some of the workers will remain to study the material they gathered on the icefloe.—*D.W.* (3)

DEFENSE

March

21—Isakov is named Chief of Staff of the Navy, replacing Galler, who is named Vice-Commissar of the Navy. —*N.Y.H.T.* (22)

May

1—The annual May Day parade across Red Square displays new motorized artillery and new long range guns in addition to the familiar war equipment.—*N.Y.T.* (2)

1—Col. General Fedor Kuznetsov is appointed commander of the Baltic Special Military District.—*N.Y.T.* (2)

5—*TASS* reports that Stalin addressed graduates of Red Army Academies, telling them that the Red Army had been rebuilt and rearmed in conformity with experience of modern warfare.—*N.Y.H.T.* (6)

8—*TASS* answers persistent and frequent foreign press reports that Soviet Russia is concentrating her land-air-and sea power in the west. The dispatch denies that troops are being

moved from the Far East to the Kiev Military District and denies further that submarines and destroyers are being sent from Baltic bases to the Caspian and Black Seas.—*N.Y.H.T.* (9)

ECONOMIC LIFE

March

14—A new decree establishes obligatory deliveries of eggs.—*N.Y.H.T.* (15)

15—A new decree is passed, making the growing of silk obligatory on collective farms in certain regions. It aims to achieve a 100% increase in silk production in the next five years.—*N.Y.T.* (16)

29—A Commissariat of the Rubber Industry is established, with Tikhon Borisovich Mitrokhin named commissar.—*N.Y.H.T.* (30)

April

10—The Estonian Supreme Soviet opens, with the 1941 state budget as the main business.—*D.W.* (11)

26—Announcement is made of the completion of a 500-mile automobile highway from Stalinabad, in Southern Turkestan, to Khorog on the Afghanistan border.—*N.Y.T.* (27)

29—12,500,000 rubles is voted to the Tadzhik Republic to repair the damage caused by the recent earthquake. Collective farmers affected are exempted from 1941 taxes.—*D.W.* (30)

May

5—A decree is issued calling for the mobilization of 700,000 boys and girls between 14 and 17 for enrollment in the trade schools.—*N.Y.H.T.* (6)

MISCELLANEOUS

March

16—Test Pilot A. N. Yekator is killed in a crash.—*N.Y.T.* (17)

April

11—The Council of People's Commissars orders a restriction on the indiscriminate celebration of anniversaries.—*N.Y.T.* (12)

- 20—Colonel Vassily Vorbiev, test pilot, is killed in a crash.—*N.Y.T.* (21)
 22—It is reported from Moscow that there has been a serious earthquake in the Pamir mountains.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)

- 23—L. J. Rovinsky is appointed editor of *Izvestia*.—*N.Y.H.T.* (24)

May

- 5—The 29th anniversary of the newspaper *Pravda* is celebrated.—*D.W.* (7)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

GENERAL FOREIGN RELATIONS

April

- 29—The Commissariat of Foreign Trade decrees a ban on the shipment of all war materials through the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (30)

May

- 1—*TASS* issues a May Day proclamation of Defense Commissar Timoshenko in which he states the readiness of the Red Army to rebuff any encroachment on Soviet territory.—*N.Y.H.T.* (1)
 1—A notice in the magazine, *Vneshnaya Torgovlia*, states that the ban on the transit of war materials across the Soviet Union has been in effect since March 18.—*N.Y.H.T.* (1)

- 9—The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decrees the introduction of ranks in the diplomatic service, to correspond with standard international practice. The ranks will be Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister, and Charge d'Affaires.—*TASS* (9)

March

EUROPE

- 15—It is reported from Ankara that President Inonu has sent a reply to Hitler's message in which he associates himself with Hitler's expression of traditional friendship and further declares that Turkey wants peace but will defend its borders. This is taken to be a renunciation of earlier Turkish claims to the defense of a security zone beyond its own frontiers.—*N.Y.T.* (16)

- 15—It is reported from Greece and Turkey that the British have landed troops in Greece.—*N.Y.T.* (16)

- 17—It is reported from Moscow that the Turkish Ambassador conferred with Vyshinsky, vice-commissar of Foreign Affairs.—*N.Y.H.T.* (18)

- 19—It is reported from Belgrade that Yugoslavia has agreed to limited adherence to the Axis.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)

- 19—Former Yugoslav Premier Stoyadinovich is exiled for his pro-German sympathies.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)

- 20—The Soviet Union returns to Hungary flags captured by the Russians in the Hungarian War of Liberation in 1848.—*N.Y.T.* (21)

- 21—A. E. Bogomolov, Charge d'Affaires in Vichy, is promoted to the rank of Ambassador.—*N.Y.H.T.* (22)

- 21—Three Serbian cabinet members resign from the Yugoslav government in protest against the negotiations with the Axis.—*N.Y.H.T.* (22)

- 22—The Yugoslav government agrees to submit to the German ultimatum.—*N.Y.H.T.* (23)

- 25—The Soviet government and the Turkish government exchange statements as to their relations. The Soviets declare that the rumors circulated abroad to the effect that the USSR would take advantage of Turkey's difficulties if it was forced to war were untrue and contrary to the Soviet position. They further stated that "if Turkey is really subject to attack and forced into war in protection of its own territory, Turkey, on the basis of the non-aggression pact with the

USSR, may count on the full understanding and neutrality of the USSR." —*TASS* (25)

25—Milan Gavrilovich, Yugoslav Minister to Moscow and leader of the Agrarian Party, resigns from his post in protest against Yugoslav's adherence to the Axis.—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)

25—The Yugoslav government signs a pact with the Axis.—*N.Y.T.* (26)

27—The regency in Yugoslavia is overthrown by a bloodless coup in opposition to adherence to the Axis. King Peter II assumes full power as King and General Simovich is named Premier.—*N.Y.T.* (28)

29—Gavrilovich, Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow, agrees to retain his post under the new government.—*N.Y.T.* (30)

30—It is reported from Ankara that Yugoslav-Turkish talks are being held.—*N.Y.T.* (31)

April

1—*Pravda* denies that the Soviet government congratulated the new Yugoslav government, but adds that such congratulations would have been in order.—*N.Y.T.* (2)

4—Gaston Bergery is appointed Vichy's Ambassador to Moscow, succeeding Erik Labonne.—*N.Y.T.* (5)

6—Germany invades Yugoslavia and Greece.—*N.Y.H.T.* (5)

6—It is announced that the USSR and Yugoslavia have signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. —*N.Y.T.* (6). (For text see p. 71)

9—Prime Minister Churchill in a speech to the House of Commons states that "there are many signs which point to an attempt to secure the granary of the Ukraine and the oil fields of the Caucasus."—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)

10—Turkey orders the evacuation of Istanbul.—*N.Y.T.* (11)

10—The Soviet Union and Norway sign a trade agreement.—*N.Y.H.T.* (11)

10—Ante Pavelich sets up an independent Croat state, centered in Zagreb. —*N.Y.H.T.* (11)

11—Hungarian troops enter the Banat region, ceded to Yugoslavia after the last war.—*N.Y.T.* (11)

11—The Yugoslav Minister to Bulgaria, Milanovich, is reported about to leave for Moscow.—*N.Y.H.T.* (12)

12—A *TASS* communique reports that the Hungarian Minister to Moscow, Kristoffy, called on Vyshinsky, vice-commissar of Foreign Affairs, to explain the sending of Hungarian troops to Yugoslavia and to express the hope that the Soviet government would recognize the justness of Hungary's action. Vyshinsky replied, "If this statement is made to invite the Soviet government to express its opinion, I must state that the Soviet government cannot approve such a step on the part of Hungary. A particularly bad impression is produced upon the Soviet government by the fact that Hungary commenced a war against Yugoslavia but four months after she concluded with the latter a pact of eternal friendship. It is not difficult to realize what would be the position of Hungary should she herself get into trouble and be torn to bits, since it is known that there are national minorities in Hungary too."—*N.Y.T.* (13)

15—Hungary issues a statement on its occupation of part of Yugoslavia, stating that Moscow's criticism indicated that the Soviet government was not correctly informed of the facts.—*N.Y.T.* (16)

16—Bulgaria is reported to have broken relations with Yugoslavia, on the grounds that Yugoslav diplomats in Bulgaria have tried to stir up a revolt.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)

16—It is reported from Istanbul that Bulgaria is invading Grecian Thrace.

Turkey states that, since the Balkan Entente was in effect dissolved when Rumania joined the Axis, there is no need for counter Turkish action.—*N.Y.H.T.* (16)

16—It is reported from London that Eden saw Ambassador Maisky in an attempt to improve Soviet-British relations.—*N.Y.T.* (17)

17—It is reported from Moscow that 25 Yugoslav aviation officers and men arrived in Moscow, April 16.—*N.Y.H.T.* (25)

19—Iranian sources in Moscow, in denying a Japanese rumor of Soviet-Iranian friction, stated that relations were friendly, in fact "better than normal" and that trade was increasing.—*N.Y.T.* (20)

21—Pavel Orlov, new Soviet envoy to Finland, arrives in Helsinki.—*N.Y.H.T.* (22)

22—The Iranian trade representative in America issued a denial of Soviet-Iranian friction.—*N.Y.T.* (23)

26—It is reported from Istanbul that Turkey has recently concluded new trade agreements with Germany and Hungary.—*N.Y.H.T.* (27)

27—Prime Minister Churchill in a speech again says that Germany may seize, for a time, the Ukraine and the Caucasus.—*N.Y.H.T.* (28)

April

29—The Rumanian Foreign Office ratifies an exchange arrangement whereby the Soviets will receive petroleum for some \$4,000,000 worth of cotton and metal.—*N.Y.H.T.* (30)

30—*Pravda* reports that on April 26 four German transport ships came to the Finnish port of Abo and landed 12,000 German troops with arms, tanks and artillery and that two days later the troops began to move to Tampere.—*N.Y.H.T.* (May 1)

May

3—It is reported by the vice-chairman of

the American Red Cross that the Commission of Polish Relief purchased in the USSR \$100,000 worth of bacon, fats and condensed milk for the children in German-held Poland.—*D.W.* (4)

5—The Soviet government announces that it has effected the release from a Bucharest prison of Anna Pauker, Rumanian labor leader. She will reside in the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (6)

8—Swedish Legation in Washington issues a statement by Foreign Minister Christian Guenther stating in part, "Not only do we wish to maintain good relations with a Russia which has friendly intentions as to the northern countries but we wish also to deepen and broaden those relations."—*N.Y.H.T.* (9)

9—The Soviet Government withdraws recognition from German-held Norway, Belgium and Yugoslavia.—*N.Y.T.* (10)

11—The Central Mixed Frontier Commission completes the work of demarcation of the Soviet-Finnish borders established by the peace treaty of March 12, 1940.—*D.W.* (12)

12—*TASS* announces that the Soviet Government accepted the proposal of the Iraq Government on May 3 for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Negotiations were carried on through the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara. *TASS* reported that at the close of 1940 the Iraq government had asked for diplomatic relations and a declaration of Soviet recognition of the independence of the Arabian countries. The Soviet Government could not make recognition contingent on such a declaration, and further negotiations were dropped at that time.—*N.Y.T.* (12)

12—First Vice Commissar of Foreign Trade Krutikov leaves for Moscow

after a visit of several weeks in Berlin discussing transport problems.—*N.Y. H.T.* (13)

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March

- 16—It is reported from Shanghai that German agents have played an important part in stirring up friction between Chungking and the Chinese Communists.—*N.Y.T.* (17)
- 18—It is announced from Tokyo that Foreign Minister Matsuoka will spend two days in Moscow on his way to Berlin and Rome.—*N.Y.T.* (19)
- 21—It is reported from Shanghai that the Soviet Union is to reopen its consulate in that city.—*N.Y.T.* (22)
- 23—Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka arrives in Moscow.—*N.Y.H.T.* (24)
- 24—Matsuoka sees Molotov and Stalin.—*N.Y.H.T.* (25)
- 13—The Soviet Union and Japan sign a neutrality pact to run for five years. Stalin sees Matsuoka off on the train.—*N.Y.H.T.* (14) (For text, see p. 72.)
- 14—It is reported from Chungking that the Soviet government has assured the Chinese government that its policy of aid to China is not altered by the pact with Japan.—*N.Y.T.* (14)
- 14—*Prauda* comment on the Soviet-Japanese pact foresees the settlement of other outstanding issues between the two countries, such as trade, fisheries, etc.—*N.Y.H.T.* (15)
- 15—The Mongolian People's Republic sends greeting to Stalin and Molotov on the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Pact of Neutrality.—*D.W.* (16)
- 20—It is reported from the Far East that Moscow has refused to issue visas for foreigners wishing to enter the Soviet Union by way of Manchouli from April 17 to May 3.—*N.Y.T.* (20)
- 24—Japan ratifies the Soviet-Japanese Pact.—*N.Y.T.* (25)

- 27—Moscow and Tokyo exchange telegrams on the ratification of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, expressing the hope for further improved relations.—*N.Y.T.* (28)

UNITED STATES

March

- 18—The U. S. Maritime Commission rejects the Soviet application to charter an American ship to carry a cargo to Vladivostok.—*N.Y.H.T.* (19)
- 19—The Soviet Foreign Office informed Ambassador Steinhardt that a gang of professional thieves has been arrested in connection with the robbing of the Roman Catholic Church of St. Louis des Francais in Moscow. The Ambassador had protested against these robberies on December 12 and February 2.—*N.Y.H.T.* (20)
- 23—Gorin, convicted of buying information on Japanese activities on the Pacific coast, leaves for Vladivostok, his sentence having been suspended on the assurance that he would leave the country immediately.—*N.Y.H.T.* (24)
- 25—The Philippine government has offered to shut down exports of war materials. It is reported that this offer arises from the fact that recently the Soviets have been making large purchases of copra.—*N.Y.T.* (26)
- 25—Under-Secretary of State Welles states in regard to the Soviet-Turkish exchange that it is a matter of satisfaction to this country when a great power like the Soviet Union reaffirms its intention of maintaining its comprehensive neutrality in the event that a neighboring country should suffer attack.—*N.Y.H.T.* (26)
- 25—It is reported from Washington that the U. S. government looks with more favor on trade with the Soviets, in view of their position in relation to Balkan developments and their assurance that purchases here are intended

exclusively for domestic use.—*N.Y.T.* (26)

April

- 7—In a press conference, Secretary of State Hull, terms the Soviet-Yugoslav Pact "encouraging."—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 10—The United States Government sues the Curtis-Wright Company for claims against it, assigned to the United States by the Soviet Government.—*N.Y.H.T.* (10)
- 14—Secretary of State Hull in a statement on the Soviet-Japanese pact, said: "The significance of the pact between the Soviet Union and Japan relating to neutrality, as reported in the press today, could be over estimated. The agreement would seem to be descriptive of a situation which has in effect existed between the two countries for some time past. It therefore comes as no surprise, although there has existed doubt whether the two governments would or would not agree to say it in writing. The policy of this government, of course, remains unchanged."—*N.Y.T.* (15)
- 17—The U. S. Maritime Commission approves a charter for a tanker to carry oil to Vladivostok or Nogaev. —*N.Y.H.T.* (18)
- 18—The U.S. Department of Commerce figures for trade with the USSR during February, 1941, give U.S. exports totaling \$9,342,000 with steam engines and boilers amounting to \$1,170,000 and petroleum and gas well drilling apparatus to \$1,519,000; U.S. imports total \$515,000.—*Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Release* (18)
- 21—At a press conference, Secretary of State Hull minimized the importance of the negotiations which have been going on for months with Ambassador Oumansky. He said that they had been desultory and concerned only minor matters.—*N.Y.H.T.* (22)

May

- 6—A Soviet citizen, G. B. Ovakimian, is arrested on charges of failing to register as a foreign agent.—*N.Y.H.T.* (6)
- 6—Brig. Gen. Maxwell, administrator of export control, states that machine tools are being withheld from the Soviet Union on the grounds that they are essential to American national defense needs.—*N.Y.H.T.* (7)
- 7—The U.S. State Department seeks an exit visa from Soviet Poland for an American citizen, Dr. Witold Putkowski, and Secretary of State Hull says that failure to obtain one would be "regarded with concern."—*N.Y.T.* (8)
- 7—It is revealed that the Maritime Commission has refused permission to the American oil firms to charter tankers to carry oil to the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (9)
- 9—U. S. Ambassador Steinhardt effects the release from Soviet prisons of an American girl and boy. Both leave for America via Vladivostok.—*N.Y.T.* (10)
- 10—The U.S. Department of Commerce issues figures on trade with the USSR during March, 1941. U.S. exports totaled \$3,590,000 with sole leather the largest item of export amounting to \$1,058,000; while imports totaled \$4,264,000 with undressed furs accounting for \$3,694,000.—*Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Release* (10)
- 14—It is reported that licenses were granted last week for the export of \$1,000,000 worth of machine tools to the Soviet Union.—*N.Y.H.T.* (15)
- 14—U.S. Department of Commerce figures for trade with the USSR for January-March show exports at a total of \$15,423,000, reexports \$978,000 and imports \$6,889,000.—*Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Release* (14)

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